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W dniu śro, 04.07.2018 o godzinie 18∶48 -0400, użytkownik Joshua Kinard |
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napisał: |
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> On 7/4/2018 5:24 PM, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> > W dniu śro, 04.07.2018 o godzinie 23∶05 +0200, użytkownik Ulrich Mueller |
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> > napisał: |
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> > > > > > > > On Wed, 4 Jul 2018, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> > > > |
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> > > > -3. Key expiry: 5 years maximum |
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> > > > +3. Key expiration: |
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> > > > + |
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> > > > + a. Primary key: 3 years maximum |
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> > > > + |
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> > > > + b. Gentoo subkey: 1 year maximum |
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> > > |
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> > > What problem are you trying to solve here? |
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> > > |
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> > |
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> > The problem of having unjustified double standards. |
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> |
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> IMHO, one year for a signing subkey is too short. I see no problem with three |
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> years like the primary key. Especially since people will typically just change |
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> the expiration and advance it the minimum number of years, lather, rinse, and |
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> repeat. It's a solution looking for a problem. |
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> |
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I don't really know the original rationale for this. |
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The NIST standard says 1-3 years. If I were to guess, I'd say 1 year |
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was chosen for subkey because subkey expiring is a 'smaller' issue than |
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the whole key expiring, i.e. other users see the primary key as being |
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still valid. |
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I suppose the advantage of having disjoint expiration times is that if |
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you forget about it, you'd learn the hard way that you need to renew it |
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before the primary key expired. |
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That said, I'm open to using a different recommendation, e.g. 2 years |
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as in riseup [1]. I suppose having the same time for both primary key |
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and subkeys would make the spec simpler, and many developers are |
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mistaking expiration times (as specified now) anyway. |
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[1]:https://riseup.net/en/security/message-security/openpgp/best-practices#use-an-expiration-date-less-than-two-years |
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |