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On Thu, 15 May 2014 14:44:58 -0400 |
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Mike Gilbert <floppym@g.o> wrote: |
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> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 1:17 PM, Ciaran McCreesh |
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> <ciaran.mccreesh@××××××××××.com> wrote: |
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> > On Thu, 15 May 2014 17:15:32 +0000 |
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> > hasufell <hasufell@g.o> wrote: |
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> >> Ciaran McCreesh: |
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> >> > Sandboxing isn't about security. |
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> >> > |
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> >> |
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> >> Sure it is. |
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> > |
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> > Then where do the bug reports for all the "security violations" |
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> > possible with sandbox go? |
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> > |
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> |
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> There is a big difference between the sandbox utility |
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> (sys-apps/sandbox) and the network-sandbox/ipc-sandbox features. The |
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> former uses an LD_PRELOAD hack to intercept libc functions, and does |
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> not provide any security benefit. The latter options create separate |
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> namespaces in the kernel, which is probably a lot more secure. |
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|
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"Secure" against what? Malicious ebuilds? Malicious packages? |
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-- |
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Ciaran McCreesh |
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