Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Evan Powers <powers.161@×××.edu>
To: gentoo-dev@g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: [gentoo-security] Verifying portage is from Gentoo
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2003 17:31:31
Message-Id: 200301131227.51008.powers.161@osu.edu
In Reply to: [gentoo-dev] Re: [gentoo-security] Verifying portage is from Gentoo by Paul de Vrieze
1 On Monday 13 January 2003 05:24 am, Paul de Vrieze wrote:
2 > Maybe the easiest way would be that some/all rsync mirrors would offer
3 > rsync over ssl, so that the origin servers could be authenticated. This
4 > would also mean some changes for clients to be able to use it.
5
6 I think something does have to be done about this.
7
8 There was a discussion about this (which I took part in) on gentoo-user and
9 then the gentoo forums. For those who are interested:
10
11 http://forums.gentoo.org/viewtopic.php?t=26137
12
13 Personally, I think it's better to cryptographically sign the portage tree
14 somehow at the source, then distribute it in the current manner. This method
15 has the advantage that we need not implicitly trust the rsync mirror admins
16 (as we currently do) and that the tree is immune to man-in-the-middle attacks
17 as it is transfered between official site and mirror or between mirror and
18 client. Secure rsync (via SSL or whatever) doesn't completely solve the
19 problem.
20
21 That said, there's many ways of signing the portage tree. I advocate having
22 the master rsync server automatically sign the tree as it checks out the CVS
23 tree. There's been a lot of talk at various times about developers signing
24 ebuilds individually, but I'm not sure that actually gains us anything. I
25 also advocate building a time-dependence into the signatures. Read my forum
26 posts for my complete musings on the matter, but here's a summary of my
27 points:
28
29 1) An authentic but out-of-date tree can be just as dangerous as a inauthentic
30 tree.
31 2) CVS works against per-developer signing of ebuilds. Consider "$Version: $",
32 etc.
33 3) Ultimately we are forced to trust CVS, so we can't realize any additional
34 security from per-developer signatures.
35
36 I present a method for efficiently signing the portage tree at the source
37 while avoiding, to some extent, the race-condition type pitfalls of rsyncing
38 while changes are in progress, etc. Read my forum posts for details.
39
40 I don't pretend to know everything about this sort of thing, so comments are
41 very welcome.
42
43 Evan Powers
44
45 --
46 gentoo-dev@g.o mailing list

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: [gentoo-security] Verifying portage is from Gentoo Dylan Carlson <absinthe@×××××.com>