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On Sun, May 01, 2011 at 11:23:40PM +0000, Duncan wrote: |
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> What about having a dedicated server-based changlog-signing key? That's |
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> still a lot of signing with a single key, but as you observed, the hazards |
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> of a loss of integrity there aren't as high as with most of the tree |
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> content. It'd require changes, but I don't believe they're out of line |
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> with that required for the rest of the proposal. |
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It means the only real trust that clients can level is on that key- |
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since it will be the last signer (thus /the/ signer) across all pkgs. |
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Get at that key, and you've got the tree, versus the current form, |
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crack all signing keys and you've got the tree. |
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Mind you this is ignoring eclasses, but getting eclasses sorted will |
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be mildly pointless if the rest of the solution has been |
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weakened/gutted since. |
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Point is, it's not *just* about having a signature on it- it's about |
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mapping the trust of that signature back, and sectioning/containing |
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compromises. What y'all are suggesting guts that layered defense. |
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~brian |
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