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On 2022-06-09 19:49, Sebastian Pipping wrote: |
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> On 08.06.22 22:42, Robin H. Johnson wrote: |
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> > EGO_SUM vs dependency tarballs: |
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> > [..] |
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> > - EGO_SUM is verifiable/reproducible from Upstream Go systems |
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> |
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> Let's be explicit, there is a _security_ threat here: as a user of an |
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> ebuild, dependency tarballs now take effort in manual review just to |
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> confirm that the content full matches its supposed list of ingredients. |
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> They are the perfect place to hide malicious code in plain sight. Now |
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> with dependency tarballs, there is a new layer that by design will |
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> likely be chronically under-audited. It gives me shivers, frankly. |
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> Previously with a manifest and upstream-only URLs, only upstream can add |
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> malicious code, not downstream in Gentoo. |
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I think dependency tarballs are a temporary solution. Maintainers should |
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send upstream patches for their release CI/scripts to include the |
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"vendor" directory. |
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Seems like there will be an option in goreleaser soon: |
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https://github.com/goreleaser/goreleaser/issues/2911 |
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I do it with just 'go' and 'tar' for the time being. |
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