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On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 6:13 AM, Paul Arthur |
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<junk+usenet@×××××××××××.com> wrote: |
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> Yes. This is the exact same issue secure-delete has, since it uses |
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> the same approach. shred is just as useful as srm (in fact it's more |
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> useful, since it doesn't mandate the full, useless run of 38 passes |
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> that srm does.) |
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"srm" doesn't mandate rewrites either. |
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Anyway, I actually forgot about "shred", so I remove my objection. |
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Other utilities in secure-delete are either simple wrappers of |
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rarely-used functionality ("sfill", "sswap"), or essentially useless |
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for modern kernels ("smem" — good luck clearing free RAM in userspace, |
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been there, tried that). |
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Some comments on replies in this thread: |
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1. Multiple rewrites are indeed useless for modern media, see [1]. |
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2. So journal metadata is not cleared. BFD. If you need 100% |
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guarantees, drop media in acid. |
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3. Wear leveling on flash media is rarer than you think, and most |
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likely doesn't do what you think, see [2]. |
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4. Wear leveling is irrelevant for the usual attack vectors, which is |
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a technician copying your naked gf photos. You need special hardware |
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to access hidden sectors. If you are worried about that, see (2). |
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[1] C. Wright et al., “Overwriting Hard Drive Data: The Great Wiping |
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Controversy”, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89862-7_21 |
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[2] E. Gal and S. Toledo, “Algorithms and Data Structures for Flash |
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Memories”, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1089733.1089735 |
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-- |
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Maxim Kammerer |
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Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte |
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