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On Thu, 03 Apr 2008 13:17:51 +0100 |
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Mike Auty <ikelos@g.o> wrote: |
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> Ciaran McCreesh wrote: |
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> | Signing offers no protection against a malicious developer. |
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> |
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> I had envisaged a system whereby when the tree was synced, as was some |
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> kind of master signed list of all acceptable dev-keys. Every package |
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> would also be signed, and would only be installed when signed. As |
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> soon as a dev becomes a liability their key is removed from the |
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> list/revoked. ~ On next sync any packages or package upgrades signed |
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> after the time of revocation would not be installed. There would be |
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> a window of vulnerability, but no bigger than with revoking a dev's |
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> access to the tree. Do you think this would offer suitable |
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> protection for users from a malicious dev or not? |
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Nope. In fact, using such a system, there are ways of getting in code |
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that doesn't get triggered until someone's key gets invalidated. |
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And if you are worrying about malicious developers, you need to worry |
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about malicious infra people too. An infra member throwing his toys out |
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of the pram can do much more lasting damage than someone who can get |
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some global scope nastiness into an ebuild for an hour or two... |
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-- |
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Ciaran McCreesh |
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