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On Sun, 2004-11-07 at 12:01 +0000, Chris Bainbridge wrote: |
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> The most likely attack is via a user submitted patch or ebuild being |
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> added to the portage tree. Since the user generated the file, he can |
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> also generate a corresponding exploit file with the same hash, and |
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> then replace the original on the rsync mirrors. |
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Except that even a user generated ebuild would be modified at the very |
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least in the ebuild headers. While this can be accounted for by the |
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original author/attacker, it makes it a bit more difficult. |
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> It's an unlikely attack in practice since as already demonstrated if |
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> you've compromised an rsync mirror you can already easily exploit |
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> clients. |
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Agreed. The people that would have the easiest access to such exploits |
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would be developers, but on that same token, a developer could do such |
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things anyway. |
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-- |
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Chris Gianelloni |
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Release Engineering - Operations/QA Manager |
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Games - Developer |
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Gentoo Linux |
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