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On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Gordon Pettey <petteyg359@×××××.com> wrote: |
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> |
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> Even if you wanted to burn the money to find that magical collision that |
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> actually contains working code, you've still got to somehow propagate that |
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> to other repositories, since they'll just ignore it for having the same hash |
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> as an already-existing object. |
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> |
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Well, if you're willing to trust that nobody is able to tamper with |
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repositories, then you don't need gpg signatures in the first place. |
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I think that gpg signatures protected by an SHA1 hash provide fairly |
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little security - a chain is as strong as its weakest link and sha1 |
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has been considered fairly weak for years now. |
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However, I think it does make sense to at least get gpg into the |
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workflow in the hopes that some day git will move to a stronger hash, |
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and since it isn't a huge hardship to do so. |
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I wouldn't make too light of the use of SHA1 though. As you point out |
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simply exploiting it isn't enough, but the whole reason for having |
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signatures is to make an attack on a central repository useless. |
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Having gpg on top of ssh keys and all that is obviously redundant, but |
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that is the whole point of it. |
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-- |
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Rich |