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On Sun, 30 Oct 2016 14:58:59 -0700 |
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Zac Medico <zmedico@g.o> wrote: |
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|
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> On 10/30/2016 01:44 PM, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> > Hi, everyone. |
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> > |
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> > Just a quick note: I've prepared a simple tool [1] to verify clones of |
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> > gentoo-mirror repositories. It's still early WiP but can be easily used |
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> > to verify a clone: |
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> > |
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> > $ ./verify-repo gentoo |
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> > [/var/db/repos/gentoo] |
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> > Untrusted signature on 42ccdf48d718287e981c00f25caea2242262906a |
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> > (you may need to import/trust developer keys) |
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> > Note: unsigned changes in metadata and/or caches found (it's fine) |
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> |
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> I don't think it's acceptable to use an unsigned metadata/cache commit. |
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> Can't we use an infrastructure key for this? |
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|
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How are you going to guarantee that a third-party didn't access |
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the remote server and alter the filesystem just before the commit? Not |
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to mention the pains of keeping the key secure. |
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|
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It's better not to sign that to provide false security. |
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|
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> > It can take any number of repository names and/or paths on argv, or |
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> > will verify all installed repositories if run without arguments. |
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> > |
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> > It has explicit support for unsigned cache update commits from |
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> > gentoo-mirror (verifies the last signed commits and diffs it against |
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> > HEAD); though it will probably get confused if signed commits out of |
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> > metadata/ subrepos come (very rare case). |
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> > |
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> > Verification is done using git's default GPG magic. I'd like to |
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> > improve it to use gkeys but the project still hasn't achieved |
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> > the ability to run out-of-the-box without local hackery. |
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> |
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> Is there an open bug for this? We really need gkeys to be usable. |
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|
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https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=526110 |
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|
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |
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<http://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/> |