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On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 13:41 -0400, Ned Ludd wrote: |
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> On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 17:45 +0100, Daniel Drake wrote: |
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> > Hi, |
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> > |
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> > The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our |
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> > users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec |
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> > |
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> > It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are |
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> > people's thoughts? |
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> |
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> I mailed Mike about this very thing a month ago. Pretty sure it should |
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> be showing up in an upcoming baselayout. But yeah it's a good idea for |
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> the nosuid part anyway. Not 100% sure about the noexec part as that |
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> might break upx which calls /proc/self/exe as part of it's decompresser |
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> routines. |
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|
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Tested it using a and it seems safe across the board. upx,busybox and |
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other multicall binaries seem quite content. Linus also recently |
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suggested that the same be done in the kernel directly via the |
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proc_fill_super() function. This seems like an ideal route to go for us |
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as it would get inherited by all the existing users who wont notice |
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the change in the default fstab file. |
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|
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-- |
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Ned Ludd <solar@g.o> |
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Gentoo Linux |
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|
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-- |
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gentoo-dev@g.o mailing list |