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On 08.06.22 22:42, Robin H. Johnson wrote: |
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> EGO_SUM vs dependency tarballs: |
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> [..] |
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> - EGO_SUM is verifiable/reproducible from Upstream Go systems |
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Let's be explicit, there is a _security_ threat here: as a user of an |
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ebuild, dependency tarballs now take effort in manual review just to |
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confirm that the content full matches its supposed list of ingredients. |
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They are the perfect place to hide malicious code in plain sight. Now |
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with dependency tarballs, there is a new layer that by design will |
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likely be chronically under-audited. It gives me shivers, frankly. |
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Previously with a manifest and upstream-only URLs, only upstream can add |
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malicious code, not downstream in Gentoo. |
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Best |
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Sebastian |
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