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>>>>> On Wed, 17 Sep 2014, Aaron W. Swenson wrote: |
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> My argument is Git using SHA-1 for checksumming is not the weakest |
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> part of our security model. |
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I had always assumed that robbat2's series of GLEPs (57 to 61) would |
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be implemented at some point. So security from the developer to the |
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master repository would be ensured by using a secure channel for |
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commits, and distribution from the repository to users would use |
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secure hashes (SHA-256 or better) and gpg signatures. |
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I didn't see any mention of this in the discussion, though. Have these |
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plans been abandoned, and are we now planning to distribute the tree |
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to users via Git, where everything goes through the bottleneck of a |
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SHA-1 sum, which was never intended as a security feature? [1] |
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If this is so, why don't we abandon all those fancy SHA-512s and |
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WHIRLPOOLs in our Manifest files, and replace them by a single SHA-1? |
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Altogether, this would save about 50 MB of space in the tree. :) |
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Ulrich |
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[1] Tech Talk: Linus Torvalds on git: "[...] the point is the SHA-1, |
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as far as Git is concerned, isn't even a security feature. It's purely |
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a consistency check. [...] It has nothing at all to do with security, |
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it's just the best hash you can get." |
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XpnKHJAok8&t=56m20s |