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On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 15:20 -0400, Mike Frysinger wrote: |
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> On Saturday 15 July 2006 13:41, Ned Ludd wrote: |
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> > On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 17:45 +0100, Daniel Drake wrote: |
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> > > The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our |
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> > > users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec |
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> > > |
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> > > It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are |
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> > > people's thoughts? |
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> > |
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> > I mailed Mike about this very thing a month ago. Pretty sure it should |
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> > be showing up in an upcoming baselayout. But yeah it's a good idea for |
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> > the nosuid part anyway. Not 100% sure about the noexec part as that |
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> > might break upx which calls /proc/self/exe as part of it's decompresser |
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> > routines. |
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> |
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> this will be in baselayout-1.12.2+ |
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Great. I'm guessing I should artificially bump 1.12.1 with a revision |
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in my snapshot for 2006.1 or we'll end up not having fixed much. |
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-- |
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Chris Gianelloni |
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Release Engineering - Strategic Lead |
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x86 Architecture Team |
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Games - Developer |
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Gentoo Linux |
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