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On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:36 AM, Jason A. Donenfeld <zx2c4@g.o> wrote: |
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> Hey guys, |
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> |
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> While our infrastructure team has some nice technical competence, the |
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> recent disaster and ongoing embarrassing aftermath has made ever more |
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> urgent the need to have end-to-end signatures between developers and |
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> users. While the infrastructure team seems fairly impressive at |
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> deploying services and keeping the house running smoothly, I'd rather |
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> we don't place additional burden on them to do everything they're |
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> doing securely. Specifically, I'd like to ensure that 100% of Gentoo's |
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> infrastructure can be hacked, yet not backdoor a single witting user |
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> of the portage tree. Right now, as it stands, rsync distributes |
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> signatures to users that are derived from some |
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> infrastructure-controlled keys, not from the developers themselves. |
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> |
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> Proposal: |
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> - Sign every file in the portage tree so that it has a corresponding |
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> .asc. Repoman will need support for this. |
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Signed hashes should be faster, no? Each directory with files could |
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have a manifest. |
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> - Ensure the naming scheme of portage files is sufficiently strict, so |
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> that renaming or re-parenting signed files doesn't result in RCE. [*] |
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> - Distribute said .asc files with rsync per usual. |
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Rsync would work with this setup, but there is also webrsync-gpg in |
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Portage right now. This covers the vast majority of usecases right |
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now. There is often no need to sync more than once per day. |
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Speaking of, the keys for that have lapsed. Will they be updated? |
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Cheers, |
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R0b0t1 |
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