Gentoo Archives: gentoo-hardened

From: Grant <emailgrant@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-hardened@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] Profile switch: hardened to non-hardened?
Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2008 20:47:25
Message-Id: 49bf44f10812261247l2997a51axe9a3b5a581994f0b@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-hardened] Profile switch: hardened to non-hardened? by "Javier J. Martínez Cabezón"
1 > Without hardened userland only in access controls. You can implement
2 > for example one Trusted Path Execution with LIDS, RSBAC, GRSEC or
3 > SELinux. They could try to stop crackers that gain unpriviledge access
4 > to the host (with a remote exploit for example) to execute exploits to
5 > scale priviledges. They could give you one least priviledge approach
6 > (as PaX does) and other useful things, as isolation of daemons,
7 > resources controls. And a lot of more. With TPE however, untrusted
8 > scripts (exploits) could be launched without execution rights, and
9 > even restricting the use of perl and python, you must grant your users
10 > the access to bash.
11
12 Thank you for taking the time to explain, but I'm afraid I don't
13 understand. I'm looking for things I can implement that don't require
14 me to understand their inner workings. This is not ideal, but I only
15 have so much time to devote to sysadmin duties since I'm not a real
16 sysadmin. My server runs a hardened profile because it hasn't caused
17 any problems, but running a hardened profile on my desktops has proven
18 to be too difficult. All of my systems run a hardened kernel but the
19 only hardened feature I've enabled in the kernel is Grsecurity set to
20 medium or low depending on the system.
21
22 Do the hardened profile and hardened kernels do me any good without
23 further configuration?
24
25 - Grant
26
27 >>> In terms of userland, non hardened profile doesn't protect you at all
28 >>> against buffer overflows, you are removing one important security
29 >>> layer. SSP protects you against buffer overflows in terms that the
30 >>> vulnerable application gets killed when the canary is modified before
31 >>> the execution of the arbitrary code. PIE protects you against return
32 >>> into libc attacks that doesn't need an executable stack. PaX is not
33 >>> perfect and needs them as complementary solutions. For example I think
34 >>> that RANDEXEC was removed from PaX time ago, one buffer overflow that
35 >>> uses return into libc attack could be succesfully against one
36 >>> non-hardened binary. Since skype is a network oriented software...
37 >>
38 >> In what situations is a hardened kernel useful?
39 >>
40 >> - Grant

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-hardened] Profile switch: hardened to non-hardened? "Javier J. Martínez Cabezón" <tazok.id0@×××××.com>