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2008/2/14, Geoff Kassel <gkassel@×××××××××××××××××.net>: |
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> Ah, I'd forgotten about this - it's been a while since I've dallied with |
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> RSBAC. I agree - the security officer is a good idea for systems where |
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> everything runs by default as root. I see it as another tactic in the whole |
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> privilege separation strategy of trying to maintain process security. |
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> |
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> I've forgotten why I'd abandoned RSBAC - perhaps it was the difficulty in |
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> getting a fully functional system running. (Maybe that's changed since I last |
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> tried it. I remember admiring the set-based ideas behind it - maybe I should |
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> give it another shot sometime.) |
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It stills hard to get a security policy under RSBAC. The main problem |
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is the lack of documentation. I have been working in a VBOX virtual |
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machine with rsbac and hardened gentoo and the dialog interface stills |
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being unusable, and some of the command line arguments tools stills |
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not being documented. But I still trying it, I think it's the better |
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alternative I've seen. |
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-- |
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