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I'm just thinking aloud here... |
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So as long as hardened gcc is used to compile the code, it makes the |
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exploitation harder compared to distros not pushing PIE as much. I think |
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other distros also acknowledged the importance of PIE, as well in the mean |
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time: |
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https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Security/Features#Built_as_PIE |
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http://wiki.debian.org/Hardening#gcc_-pie_-fPIE |
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For a userland like that, binaries compiled without the hardened toolchain |
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are the easiest to exploit. Binary packages, third-party binaries, |
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closed-source binaries. These software are usually important executables |
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way over 20k. |
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|
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I wonder how these ROP techniques can theoretically perform in a java |
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virtual machine? What are the possbile target vectors for Python or Ruby? |
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What about JIT code? |
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-- |
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dr Tóth Attila, Radiológus, 06-20-825-8057 |
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Attila Toth MD, Radiologist, +36-20-825-8057 |
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|
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2013.Március 26.(K) 10:18 időpontban Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón ezt írta: |
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> PIE is used in hardened gentoo, If PIE can't protect you against this, |
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> ssp at least could try to do it, this is the reason because |
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> -fstack-protector-all and -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 are needed, and at least |
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> -fstack-protector-all is really extended in hardened gentoo.. as |
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> another security layer. . |
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> |
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> 2013/3/25, "Tóth Attila" <atoth@××××××××××.hu>: |
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>> Is gentoo-hardened better regarding the amount of unrandomized code |
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>> compared to other distros? |
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>> -- |
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>> dr Tóth Attila, Radiológus, 06-20-825-8057 |
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>> Attila Toth MD, Radiologist, +36-20-825-8057 |
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>> |
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>> 2013.Március 25.(H) 13:52 időpontban PaX Team ezt írta: |
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>>> On 25 Mar 2013 at 9:01, Kfir Lavi wrote: |
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>>> |
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>>>> Hi, |
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>>>> I'm looking for a way to reduce glibc code size. |
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>>>> It can be a way to make system smaller and minimize the impact |
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>>>> of attack vectors in glibc, as in return-to-libc attack. |
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>>> |
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>>> study this and draw your conclusions whether the whole exercise is |
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>>> worth it or not: |
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>>> |
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>>> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenix-security-11/q-exploit-hardening-made-easy |
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>>> |
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>>> |
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>> |
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>> |
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>> |
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>> |
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> |
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> |
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