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On Mon, 20 Aug 2018 16:57:52 -0400 Alec Warner wrote: |
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> On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 4:27 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand <k_f@g.o> |
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> wrote: |
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> |
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> > On 08/20/2018 10:18 PM, Alec Warner wrote: |
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> > > Are there other ways to measure if the keys are used in the manner we are |
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> > > hoping for? |
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> > |
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> > Nope... additional complexity arise if multiple signing keys exists |
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> > (primary or subkeys), and furthermore there is no guarantee the key is |
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> > stored on key only. |
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> > |
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> |
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> > That said, the actual security is even further muddied by operational |
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> > security concerns regarding how the primary key is accessed even in the |
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> > event signing subkey is on card only.. and other security precations |
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> > required by the developers for the token to have any meaningful addition |
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> > to security as an attacker can anyways just wait for it to be be |
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> > available, in particular if not mandating forcesig on the openpgp applet |
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> > and counting the number of signatures manually to detect abnormalities. |
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> > |
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> |
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> I assert that the hardware token, when the key is stored only in the token |
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> and not in another place online, prevents export of key material. |
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|
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No, it doesn't. The cost of extracting a key from a stolen token is |
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approximately $1000 depending on a token model. |
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The problem is that people are considering a token as a silver |
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bullet protecting them reliably. While protection will be indeed |
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improved a bit, this is all the gain; and relaxed state of false |
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security may prove to be more dangerous than not to have tokens at |
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all. |
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|
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Best regards, |
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Andrew Savchenko |
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