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Dear Michał, |
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|
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I have read your your manifesto for election as Trustee, and have some |
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questions about issue you raise there. They also impact what you think |
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of the Council's work, and I believe a public thread can help clarify |
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both your positions, as well as others who might be running for |
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positions in council or trustees. |
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|
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|
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> 1. Gentoo should be self-governing, and the Foundation should support |
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> it. Think of it as a good parent that cares about the well-being |
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> of its child but lets it make its own decisions and make its own |
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> mistakes. |
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If the mistakes have legal consequences: |
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1.i. To what extent have you examined which of the involved parties have |
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individual & joint liabilities for those mistakes? |
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1.ii. Aside from the legalities of HOW to share the joint & individual |
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liabilities, how do you THINK the liabilities should be shared? |
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|
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> 1.a. ... |
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> Example: Council decides that <init1> is not worth supporting |
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> anymore, and developers should focus on <init2> anymore. |
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> 1.c. ... |
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> Example: Council decides that <init1> is not worth supporting. |
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> However, a developer requests a bounty for improving status |
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> of <init1>. |
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(And also 1.c. which has the same premise) |
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|
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I agree with your "GOOD" responses here: they are clear that there should |
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be dialogue & compromise, while your "BAD" responses are basically |
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unilateral actions by the Trustees. |
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|
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What worries me is the level of power that you ascribe to the council |
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over developers & projects. |
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|
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Can you clarify your implication here that the Council can demand |
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developers remove or otherwise stop supporting a package by Council |
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decree? |
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|
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Short of legal reasons to do so, I believe that this would set a |
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dangerous precedent directly. |
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|
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Gentoo has a historical practice of permitting developers to support |
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whatever they want to work on, provided it doesn't directly conflict |
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with other packages: Users should have the CHOICE of both init1 & init2 |
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as long as developers are willing to maintain them. |
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|
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The bounty would need specific careful wording regardless, and would |
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have to be free of conflict of interest. E.g. ensure that init1 remains |
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a choice in Gentoo. |
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|
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The same should apply to architectures, not just packages. |
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Should the council be able to unilateral decide, despite a developer's |
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intentions, that an architecture is no longer supported at all? |
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Can the developer submit funding requests for new hosts in that |
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architecture that live in the racks at OSL? |
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|
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> 2. Transparency is important. Trustees should clearly inform |
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> the community what is happening, what are they doing, what |
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> the outcome of meetings is, in proper human-intended messages. |
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> The notable exception of what can't be revealed due to law |
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> or contracts. |
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To be clear, you're happy as long as the outcome is transparent? |
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Contract discussions are usually considered sensitive to business needs, and |
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generally not public, even if most of the contract outcome is public in the |
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end. |
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|
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What do you think that the Trustees can do to better convey ongoing trustee |
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activity, that occurs between meetings, and/or in the absence of meetings? |
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|
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Years ago, I ran for a trustee position on a manifesto of increasing |
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transparency. Retrospectively, I feel that I only made a little progress into |
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the overall scope of the issue. |
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|
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> 3. Trustees were split around the world so far, and in the last term |
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> they practically failed to meet. Ideally, Trustees should try |
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> to arrange regular open meetings with the community. However, |
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> if that becomes cumbersome they should focus on asynchronous |
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> communications (mail) and/or smaller meetings, with votes being |
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> done via mail or bugs. Inability to arrange regular meetings |
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> must not paralyze the Foundation. |
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As Antarus pointed out elsewhere, only the AGM is formally required by law, and |
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it must be open. |
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|
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I think that the asynchronous structure, and smaller non-formal private setting |
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used in the latest term helped a lot towards actual progress on events. The |
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down-side as you raised in point 2, is that there was very little transparency |
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to it. |
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|
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As the first concrete example, the matter of retaining Corporate Capital CPA |
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was discussed heavily on the internal trustees@ alias, as well as the |
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trustees-only IRC channel. The discussions included our own prep for the two |
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phone calls with the CPA (preparing various documentation they asked for on |
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bylaws, articles of incorporation, financial statements, prior IRS |
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interactions), back-channel during the phone calls, notes during the phone |
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calls, and the actual recording of the calls. |
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|
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The two resulting motions [exploration with IRS, and filing preperations] were |
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on bugzilla & email. |
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|
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The Nitrokey business discussions and implementation discussions were ALSO |
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similarly opaque, leading the this impression of 'failed to meet' meaning |
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'paralyzed'. |
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|
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> 4. & 5. (discussion of the future legal structure of the NFP) |
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I think we should cross that bridge when we get to it, and continue efforts on |
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the things needed to GET to either of these outcomes. Make sure the present |
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efforts are lost or stalled as much as possible. |
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|
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To that end, I need to write a message to the -project list looking for any |
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existing developers with both book-keeping skills & some time on their hands to |
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help wrangle the raw FY2019 data. |
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|
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> 6. We should aim to minimize the split between non-Foundation |
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> and Foundation part of Gentoo. This is already partially solved |
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> by requiring Trustees to be Gentoo developers. The next logical step |
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> is to require all Foundation members to be developers as well. |
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> This involves working with Council/Recruiters to extend developer |
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> status for Foundation members interested in it. |
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I say here that I'm going to agree to disagree with you on the concept, while |
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willing to discuss the nuances of implementation. |
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|
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I think that membership SHOULD be wider than the developer base, provided that |
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all members are individuals (no corporations should be members). This primarily |
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has impacts in fund-raising: Look at the membership & corporate sponsors of the |
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ASF. The many but not all of ASF corporate sponsors have or had at least one |
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individual who is or was a member of the ASF. The members MAY contribute in |
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non-coding ways, but might be as simple as voting on issues that are the |
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concern of their employer [I have heard hearsay about bloc-voting behaviors |
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within the ASF, but I have nothing to corroborate them]. |
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|
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Membership should conveys a vested interest in the actions of the Foundation, |
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and the outcomes in Gentoo Linux. |
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|
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If your intent is to create an "easy" route to Foundation members to gain |
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developer status, and changing undertakers practices in the process, then |
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please count me as interested in your proposal. |
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|
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As a first step, how about move undertakers to taking away unused commit bits, |
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but not dropping people from being developers. Don't worry about "@gentoo.org" |
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being a status signifier. |
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|
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-- |
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Robin Hugh Johnson |
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Gentoo Linux: Dev, Infra Lead, Foundation Treasurer |
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E-Mail : robbat2@g.o |
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GnuPG FP : 11ACBA4F 4778E3F6 E4EDF38E B27B944E 34884E85 |
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GnuPG FP : 7D0B3CEB E9B85B1F 825BCECF EE05E6F6 A48F6136 |