Re: [gentoo-nfp] Developer Crypto Hardware (AGM)

[Andrew Savchenko]

On Tue, 21 Aug 2018 08:44:22 +0200 Michał Górny wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-08-21 at 02:26 +0300, Andrew Savchenko wrote:
> > On Mon, 20 Aug 2018 16:57:52 -0400 Alec Warner wrote:
> > > On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 4:27 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand <k_f@g.o>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > On 08/20/2018 10:18 PM, Alec Warner wrote:
> > > > > Are there other ways to measure if the keys are used in the manner we are
> > > > > hoping for?
> > > >
> > > > Nope... additional complexity arise if multiple signing keys exists
> > > > (primary or subkeys), and furthermore there is no guarantee the key is
> > > > stored on key only.
> > > >
> > > > That said, the actual security is even further muddied by operational
> > > > security concerns regarding how the primary key is accessed even in the
> > > > event signing subkey is on card only.. and other security precations
> > > > required by the developers for the token to have any meaningful addition
> > > > to security as an attacker can anyways just wait for it to be be
> > > > available, in particular if not mandating forcesig on the openpgp applet
> > > > and counting the number of signatures manually to detect abnormalities.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I assert that the hardware token, when the key is stored only in the token
> > > and not in another place online, prevents export of key material.
> >
> > No, it doesn't. The cost of extracting a key from a stolen token is
> > approximately $1000 depending on a token model.
>
> What is the cost of extracting a key from a stolen hard drive?

Keys on my hard drive have double encryption using independent
algorithms and passwords. So if we are talking about cost of
retrieving such case from hard drive alone (and not other attack
vectors), it will be infinite.
 
> What are the costs of other attack vectors on Gentoo, for comparison?

Please specify other attack vectors to have well founded further
discussion.

Best regards,
Andrew Savchenko