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On Saturday 17 February 2007, Brian Harring wrote: |
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> Security impact is from a pkg potentially dragging along old libs; if |
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> you've got a stable pkg that gets an update once every blue moon, it |
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> can hold onto the lib for a *long* time while still using the lib; |
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> thus if a vuln. in the lib, said pkg still is screwed. |
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umm, no ... the package itself is updated against the new copy while the old |
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copy exists for other packages that have already been built |
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> Other angle is someone intentionally forcing usage of a known bad |
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> library that is still dangling. Corner case, but doable. |
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as i said, this is the "invalid" syntax: |
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... /usr/lib/libfoo.so.3 ... |
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besides, this is not a real concern ... if a user is purposefully relinking |
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against files because it has a security issue, they have the ability to do a |
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lot more than any bug exposed in the library |
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> Bit curious how this is going to behave if via linked in libs, new loc |
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> and old get loaded alongside... |
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this would require multiple libraries to be involved in the equation and the |
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answer is undefined behavior which most certainly result in runtime |
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failures ... |
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besides, just like the gcc-3.3 -> gcc-3.4 transition, if you dont run |
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revdep-rebuild and things are breaking, it's your own fault |
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-mike |
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