| 1 |
On 03/07/2015 05:24 PM, Brian Dolbec wrote: |
| 2 |
> On Sat, 07 Mar 2015 15:26:26 -0800 |
| 3 |
> Zac Medico <zmedico@g.o> wrote: |
| 4 |
> |
| 5 |
>> On 03/06/2015 09:50 AM, Mark Kubacki wrote: |
| 6 |
>>> We're on the same side here. |
| 7 |
>>> |
| 8 |
>>> Do we have numbers showing the ratio "portage used with defaults" |
| 9 |
>>> vs. where "[webrsync-gpg] is described in many hardening guides for |
| 10 |
>>> gentoo and widely used among the security conscious" applies? |
| 11 |
>>> |
| 12 |
>>> DNS not being encrypted is just painting the whole picture. Point |
| 13 |
>>> is, the default is that "emerge --sync" results in a transfer using |
| 14 |
>>> RSYNC (or http). |
| 15 |
>>> |
| 16 |
>>> And by default you cannot compare the result with any authoritative |
| 17 |
>>> source. |
| 18 |
>>> |
| 19 |
>> |
| 20 |
>> Ideally, we can rely on security mechanisms built into git [1], |
| 21 |
>> possibly involving signed commits. |
| 22 |
>> |
| 23 |
>> [1] https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo-portage-rsync-mirror |
| 24 |
> |
| 25 |
> |
| 26 |
> Actually, git makes it nearly impossible to get the correct info |
| 27 |
> required to re-process the git commit signature. It is all embedded |
| 28 |
> into the commit itself, but not in a way for gpg to be able to |
| 29 |
> re-verify it. Git relies on the issuer's gpg verification status which |
| 30 |
> it records in it's data before the push. So, without some major |
| 31 |
> hacking on git data, it is not viable for routine verification purposes. |
| 32 |
|
| 33 |
Maybe we can use the relatively recently added git verify-commit command |
| 34 |
[1]. If we run that command with --verbose, then we can use that to |
| 35 |
verify that that a commit was signed with a trusted key. Shouldn't |
| 36 |
verification of the HEAD commit be enough to vouch for the integrity of |
| 37 |
the entire tree? |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
[1] |
| 40 |
https://github.com/git/git/commit/d07b00b7f31d0cb6675b4bdba269ce7f087ddd24 |
| 41 |
-- |
| 42 |
Thanks, |
| 43 |
Zac |
Archives