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On Tue, 10 Mar 2015 17:48:58 +0000 |
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Patrick Schleizer <patrick-mailinglists@××××××.org> wrote: |
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|
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> Hi, |
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> |
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> I am wondering why posts by Vladimir Diaz and Justin Cappos are not |
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> visible on the gentoo-portage-dev mailing list archive. |
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> |
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> Lost in spam filter? |
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> |
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> Have you received them? |
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> |
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> Should the listmaster be contacted? |
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> |
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> Cheers, |
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> Patrick |
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> |
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You must be subscribed to the list in order to post. No spam filter |
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that I know of other than the above. Perhaps it's a blocking issue, |
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I've heard some domains/subdomains cause issues and/or blocked or |
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something along those lines. |
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> Vladimir Diaz: |
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> > Hi, |
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> > |
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> > I am a developer in the Secure Systems Lab at NYU. Our lab has |
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> > collaborated with popular software update systems in the open-source |
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> > community, including APT, yum, and YaST, to address security |
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> > problems. More recently, we have been working on a flexible |
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> > security framework co-developed with the Tor project that can be |
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> > easily added to software updaters to transparently solve many of |
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> > the known security flaws we have uncovered in software updaters. |
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> > We would like to work with The Portage Development Project to |
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> > better secure the Portage distribution system. |
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> > |
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> > TUF |
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> > <https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf#a-framework-for-securing-software-update-systems> |
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> > (The Update Framework) is a library that can be added to an existing |
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> > software update system and is designed to update files in a more |
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> > secure manner. Many software updaters verify software updates with |
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> > cryptographic signatures and hash functions, but they typically |
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> > fail to protect against malicious attacks that target the metadata |
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> > and update files presented to clients. A rollback attack is one |
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> > such example, where an attacker tricks a client into installing |
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> > older files than those the client has already seen (these older |
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> > files may be vulnerable versions that have since been fixed). A |
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> > full list of attacks and weaknesses the framework is designed to |
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> > address is provided here |
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> > <https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/blob/develop/SECURITY.md#security> . |
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> > |
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> > Our website <http://theupdateframework.com/index.html> includes more |
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> > information about TUF, including: papers |
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> > <https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/tree/develop/docs/papers> |
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> > and a specification |
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> > <https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/blob/develop/docs/tuf-spec.txt>. |
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> > If you want to see how an existing project integrates TUF, there is |
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> > a standards track proposal |
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> > <https://github.com/pypa/interoperability-peps/blob/master/pep-0458-tuf-online-keys.rst#abstract> |
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> > to the Python community that you can review. A more rigorous |
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> > proposal that requires more administrative work on the repository, |
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> > but provides more security protections, is also available |
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> > <https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0480/>. |
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> > |
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> > Thanks, |
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> > Vlad |
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> > |
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> > P.S. |
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> > There is an informational Gentoo Linux Enhancement Proposal that |
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> > references the security issues that our project addresses, but |
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> > there hasn't been much recent activity. |
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> > |
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> > |
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> > -- |
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> > vladimir.v.diaz@×××××.com |
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> > PGP fingerprint = ACCF 9DCA 73B9 862F 93C5 6608 63F8 90AA 1D25 3935 |
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> > -- |
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> > |
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> |
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> |
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-- |
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Brian Dolbec <dolsen> |