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On 01/16/2018 08:32 PM, Mike Gilbert wrote: |
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> On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 4:46 PM, Mike Frysinger <vapier@g.o> wrote: |
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>> From: Mike Frysinger <vapier@××××××××.org> |
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>> |
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>> Some ebuilds are a bit hard to fix their use of the network in src |
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>> phases, so allow them to disable things. This allows us to turn off |
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>> access by default and for the vast majority while we work out how to |
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>> fix the few broken packages. |
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> |
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> If we are going to allow network sandboxing to be disabled in |
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> individual ebuilds, we should also allow the other sandboxes to be |
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> disabled for the same reasons. sys-apps/sandbox has been notoriously |
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> buggy, for example. |
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|
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Yeah, that sounds reasonable. We have ACCEPT_RESTRICT and |
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package.accept_restrict in case people want to mask packages with |
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certain restrict values. |
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> Also, valid RESTRICT values are specified in PMS, so this really |
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> belongs in an a new EAPI. |
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|
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PMS says: Package managers may recognise other tokens, but ebuilds may |
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not rely upon them being supported. |
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-- |
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Thanks, |
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Zac |
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