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On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Raymond Jennings <shentino@×××××.com> |
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wrote: |
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> On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 5:39 PM, Andreas K. Hüttel <dilfridge@g.o> |
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> wrote: |
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> |
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>> Am Donnerstag, 13. Oktober 2016, 01:30:23 schrieb Robin H. Johnson: |
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>> |
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>>> TL;DR: move comrel, infra, PR to Foundation. |
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>>> |
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>> |
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>> No. For the following reasons not: |
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>> |
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>> In the past the foundation trustees have shown to be fairly detached from |
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>> the |
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>> Gentoo daily life, and as a consequence happily added known troublemakers |
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>> to |
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>> the foundation membership list. |
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>> This is not a body qualified have oversight of the developer community in |
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>> any |
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>> way. |
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>> |
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> |
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> If the foundation is truly detached from the community of developers |
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> maintaining the very Gentoo it is meant to |
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> |
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> I think we should do an audit of the foundation's members, seeing how many |
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> of them are attached to gentoo and care about it, how many don't care. If |
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> there truly is "dead weight" on the council |
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|
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I meant foundation, not council. Got confused here. |
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> , or worse, toxic troublemakers, then the foundation's membership ought to |
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> be trimmed. If that's NOT the case, then finding out how much they really |
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> do care about Gentoo should give us confidence in them. |
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> |
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> Ostensibly though its the foundation's job to care about gentoo, and |
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> if/when the foundation's membership is rightsized and pruned (if needed) I |
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> would deem them worthy of the trust to handle those oversight roles. |
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> |
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> ------------------------- |
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> |
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> Regarding the chicken and egg post earlier: |
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> |
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> There may also be a potential chicken-egg-fox triangle |
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> |
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> A) comrel can remove developres |
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> B) council oversees comrel/appeals of comrel cases |
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> C) developers elect council |
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> |
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> Put these three together and we have a potential feedback loop. For this |
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> reason I also support out-of-the-loop oversight. |
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> |
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> The fact that devs elect council, and council handles comrel appeals, |
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> effectively means that comrel, at least in theory, has the ability to |
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> control, even if indirectly, the composition of any oversight it gets. |
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> |
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> I would far rather have comrel supervised by someone |
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> (individual/group/whatever) with a vested interest in the welfare of the |
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> gentoo community, and who would continue to have that vested interest |
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> regardless of any politics that happens among the develoeprs and/or council |
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> and/or comrel. |
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> |
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> By acclamation, I would assume that "ideal overseer" would be the |
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> foundation itself. If I remember my dev quiz right, foundation membership |
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> is open to those who have demonstrated a faithful support of gentoo's |
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> interests...of which becoming a dev is only one method among many to prove |
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> such faithfulness. |
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> |
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> The ability of comrel to involuntarily retire developers (who elect |
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> council) is what concerns me about a potential feedback loop. |
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> |
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> As far as infra, they should be overseen by the foundation as well. If |
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> I'm not mistaken, gentoo assets are owned by the foundation (thus saith dev |
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> quiz), and I presume that would include the physical server hardware as |
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> well as the copyrights etc. So legally, they have a vested interest in |
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> ensuring that their server hardware assets are properly managed, and that |
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> IMO would give them the prerogative of exercising oversight over the infra |
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> team. |
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> |
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> My opinion overall is thus: |
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> |
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> 1. The project structure works well at keeping tabs on who is responsible |
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> for what, and does good at keeping things organized. |
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> 2. Having project leads and project members with oversight of each other |
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> keeps the project with a cohesive leadership, and keeps the project united |
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> as a team |
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> 3. Some "projects", however, are special because they ahve powers and/or |
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> responsiblities that go beyond mere software or ebuild. |
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> 4. Because of point 3, I think some projects should be special cases. |
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> Included but not limited to comrel, infra, PR, recruiters, comres. |
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> 5. Related to point 4, I think that said projects should be directly |
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> overseen by the foundation. At the very least, the leads of said projects |
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> should be subject to oversight by the foundation, and not merely the |
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> existing project members or the council. |
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> |
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> Even if the foundation isn't ideal, at the very least the above "projects" |
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> should be flagged as special cases that should not be subject to the |
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> mundane procedures that apply to "normal" projects. |
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> |
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> |