Gentoo Archives: gentoo-project

From: Raymond Jennings <shentino@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-project@l.g.o
Cc: "Robin H. Johnson" <robbat2@g.o>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-project] Groups under the Council or Foundation: the structure & processes thereof
Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2016 05:35:53
Message-Id: CAGDaZ_qg50Ehkz+KE+qNQvUHSUNzoi-jf7wc-xhweQUiVpz51A@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-project] Groups under the Council or Foundation: the structure & processes thereof by Raymond Jennings
1 On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Raymond Jennings <shentino@×××××.com>
2 wrote:
3
4 > On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 5:39 PM, Andreas K. Hüttel <dilfridge@g.o>
5 > wrote:
6 >
7 >> Am Donnerstag, 13. Oktober 2016, 01:30:23 schrieb Robin H. Johnson:
8 >>
9 >>> TL;DR: move comrel, infra, PR to Foundation.
10 >>>
11 >>
12 >> No. For the following reasons not:
13 >>
14 >> In the past the foundation trustees have shown to be fairly detached from
15 >> the
16 >> Gentoo daily life, and as a consequence happily added known troublemakers
17 >> to
18 >> the foundation membership list.
19 >> This is not a body qualified have oversight of the developer community in
20 >> any
21 >> way.
22 >>
23 >
24 > If the foundation is truly detached from the community of developers
25 > maintaining the very Gentoo it is meant to
26 >
27 > I think we should do an audit of the foundation's members, seeing how many
28 > of them are attached to gentoo and care about it, how many don't care. If
29 > there truly is "dead weight" on the council
30
31
32 I meant foundation, not council. Got confused here.
33
34
35 > , or worse, toxic troublemakers, then the foundation's membership ought to
36 > be trimmed. If that's NOT the case, then finding out how much they really
37 > do care about Gentoo should give us confidence in them.
38 >
39 > Ostensibly though its the foundation's job to care about gentoo, and
40 > if/when the foundation's membership is rightsized and pruned (if needed) I
41 > would deem them worthy of the trust to handle those oversight roles.
42 >
43 > -------------------------
44 >
45 > Regarding the chicken and egg post earlier:
46 >
47 > There may also be a potential chicken-egg-fox triangle
48 >
49 > A) comrel can remove developres
50 > B) council oversees comrel/appeals of comrel cases
51 > C) developers elect council
52 >
53 > Put these three together and we have a potential feedback loop. For this
54 > reason I also support out-of-the-loop oversight.
55 >
56 > The fact that devs elect council, and council handles comrel appeals,
57 > effectively means that comrel, at least in theory, has the ability to
58 > control, even if indirectly, the composition of any oversight it gets.
59 >
60 > I would far rather have comrel supervised by someone
61 > (individual/group/whatever) with a vested interest in the welfare of the
62 > gentoo community, and who would continue to have that vested interest
63 > regardless of any politics that happens among the develoeprs and/or council
64 > and/or comrel.
65 >
66 > By acclamation, I would assume that "ideal overseer" would be the
67 > foundation itself. If I remember my dev quiz right, foundation membership
68 > is open to those who have demonstrated a faithful support of gentoo's
69 > interests...of which becoming a dev is only one method among many to prove
70 > such faithfulness.
71 >
72 > The ability of comrel to involuntarily retire developers (who elect
73 > council) is what concerns me about a potential feedback loop.
74 >
75 > As far as infra, they should be overseen by the foundation as well. If
76 > I'm not mistaken, gentoo assets are owned by the foundation (thus saith dev
77 > quiz), and I presume that would include the physical server hardware as
78 > well as the copyrights etc. So legally, they have a vested interest in
79 > ensuring that their server hardware assets are properly managed, and that
80 > IMO would give them the prerogative of exercising oversight over the infra
81 > team.
82 >
83 > My opinion overall is thus:
84 >
85 > 1. The project structure works well at keeping tabs on who is responsible
86 > for what, and does good at keeping things organized.
87 > 2. Having project leads and project members with oversight of each other
88 > keeps the project with a cohesive leadership, and keeps the project united
89 > as a team
90 > 3. Some "projects", however, are special because they ahve powers and/or
91 > responsiblities that go beyond mere software or ebuild.
92 > 4. Because of point 3, I think some projects should be special cases.
93 > Included but not limited to comrel, infra, PR, recruiters, comres.
94 > 5. Related to point 4, I think that said projects should be directly
95 > overseen by the foundation. At the very least, the leads of said projects
96 > should be subject to oversight by the foundation, and not merely the
97 > existing project members or the council.
98 >
99 > Even if the foundation isn't ideal, at the very least the above "projects"
100 > should be flagged as special cases that should not be subject to the
101 > mundane procedures that apply to "normal" projects.
102 >
103 >