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On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 09:15:37AM +0200, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> Hello, everyone. |
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> |
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> Gentoo is technically led by two bodies -- the Council and the Trustees. |
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> While this somewhat works for many years, people have repeatedly pointed |
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> out that it's far from perfect and that it is preventing Gentoo from |
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> gaining more popularity. Some of them are looking into the times of |
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> BDFL with longing, others are considering it the worst thing ever. |
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> Nevertheless, there are problems with the current state of things. |
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> |
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|
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I do not recall any discussions on how the current model is impacting |
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popularity of the distro. I am not asking for evidence, but if this is |
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purely based around previous "power struggles" then I would agree. |
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|
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> Firstly, we have two leading bodies and still no clear distinction |
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> between their roles. Some developers agree on split being here, some |
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> developers put it elsewhere but in the end, nothing has been really |
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> decided. From time to time one of the bodies tries to push their border |
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> forward, then backs down and we're back where we started. |
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> |
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|
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There have been struggles that I recall in the past with the foundation |
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attempting to over step it's bounds. As others have mentioned, this is |
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inevitable regardless of structure barring any BDFL like scenarios. |
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|
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I have postulated that the current structure works and there are avenues |
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to codify distinct roles in the "two bodies." This can be done in the |
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by-laws. |
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|
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Ultimately, the council runs the distro and the foundation ensures that |
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the distro is supported financially and legally. Pure and simple. The |
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Foundation has no play in technical matters or determining how the |
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council is to govern the distro (OFC, unless something bleeds over into |
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legal matters). |
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|
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I am not speaking for Robin here, but I completely agree with his |
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approach for how infra interacts with the various entities within |
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Gentoo. This same "due diligence", based on role, is imperative for all to |
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understand regardless of personal opinion. |
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|
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> Secondly, for historical reasons the both bodies are elected by two |
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> electorates that only partially overlap. Surely, today the overlap is |
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> reasonable but is there any real reason for different people to elect |
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> both bodies? In the end, it is entirely possible for one body to |
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> arbitrarily change their electorate and made it completely disjoint. |
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> |
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|
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This definitely must be fixed. I believe a decision to determine the |
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electorate should be made and it must be the same. |
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|
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> Thirdly, large governing bodies don't really work. Instead of having |
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> one consistent vision of Gentoo, we have 12. What we get is a semi- |
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> random combination of parts of their visions that just happened to hit |
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> majority in their votes. It gets absurd to the point that a body can |
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> make half-way decisions just because first half passed vote |
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> and the second didn't (remember closing -dev but leaving -project |
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> open?). |
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> |
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|
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Assuming roles are clearly defined, I believe this point becomes moot. |
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Someone should own the ML's from a governing perspective. |
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|
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> On the other, it's small enough for them to be able to actively work |
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> together and directly establish a common set of goals (i.e. via |
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> an agreement rather than a majority vote). |
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> |
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> |
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|
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Agree with others that this lowers the bar even more for a possible |
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takeover. |
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|
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-- |
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Cheers, |
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Aaron |