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On Tue, 4 Dec 2018 17:05:55 -0500 |
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Michael Orlitzky <mjo@g.o> wrote: |
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|
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> |
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> This is technically correct, but: how many users even know what a |
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> security-supported arch is? I would guess zero, to a decimal point or |
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> two. Where would I encounter that information in my daily life? |
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> |
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> If I pick up any software system that's run by professionals and that |
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> has a dedicated security team, my out-of-the-box assumption is that |
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> there aren't any known, glaring, and totally fixable security |
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> vulnerabilities being quietly handed to me. |
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> |
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> Having a stable arch that isn't security-supported is a meta-fail... we |
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> have a system that fails open by giving people something that looks like |
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> it should be safe and then (when it bites them) saying "but you didn't |
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> read the fine print!" It should be the other way around: they should |
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> have to read the fine print before they can use those arches. |
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> |
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|
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I very much agree with this. If we end up deciding on keeping the |
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"supported arches" system, I would like to propose that we also add a |
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big red warning, on the download page of unsupported arches, that |
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states that this can't be considered secure and that links to our |
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Vulnerability Treatment Policy. |
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|
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I don't have arm systems anymore, but for a while I did and at the |
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time, I wasn't aware at all of this situation. That's not fun and we |
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probably have many arm users right now who are unknowingly running |
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insecure systems. |
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|
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Regards, |
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Virgil Dupras |