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On Mon, Oct 3, 2016 at 6:40 PM, William L. Thomson Jr. |
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<wlt-ml@××××××.com> wrote: |
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> On Monday, October 3, 2016 6:12:16 PM EDT Rich Freeman wrote: |
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>> |
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>> 1. How do we reconcile the differing membership of the developer and |
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>> Foundation communities? |
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> |
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> In most other projects, the foundation/board controls the direction of |
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> development. Best examples are Gnome and FreeBSD, maybe Debian. |
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|
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That is nice, but I didn't talk about reconciling the boards, but the |
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membership: the people voting for the boards. There are devs who |
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aren't Foundation members, and there are Foundation members who aren't |
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devs. The former is easy to handle (devs can juts apply to become |
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members). The latter is harder to handle (do we start automatically |
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kicking members as soon as they're no longer developers? If not, you |
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now have a distro whose direction has more outside control by people |
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who don't necessarily have the same stake in it. |
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|
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>> 2. If only one body is ultimately in charge, what kinds of qualities |
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>> do we want in its leadership? Ultimately they'd have authority over |
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>> both technical and financial concerns (in reality, no matter what you |
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>> put on paper). Does it make more sense to elect a financial board and |
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>> have them have oversight over the technical side? Or does it make |
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>> sense to have a technical board, and have them have oversight of the |
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>> financial side? Or do we go for both in one (which means finding |
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>> people who are both competent and interested in dealing with both)? I |
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>> think the reality is that you need both in one to some degree, since |
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>> all issues would ultimately fall on them. |
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> |
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> Typically finances follow development. In other projects like Gnome board |
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> members tend to be businesses. Which I assume if they agree with direction |
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> help provide further funding. |
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Again, that doesn't really speak to the qualities of the leadership. |
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|
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Should a board member be good at legal stuff (so that the lawsuits and |
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such you speak of don't happen)? Or should they be better at |
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technical stuff (since they have the power to override everybody else |
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on technical matters? Or do we need people who want to do both? Will |
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both areas get the proper attention when people's efforts are divided |
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across them, vs having a group of people whose only job is to ensure |
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the IRS is happy and that we're following the law, and so on? If |
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you're concerned that either the Council or the Trustees aren't doing |
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their job right, then splitting the effort of one board across both |
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areas is hardly going to improve things, since there is no obvious |
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synergy. |
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|
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Note that neither the council nor the Foundation currently sets any |
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kind of direction for Gentoo. They decide on overall policies, but |
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where Gentoo invests tends to be up to the individual contributors. |
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If we have a lot of Java contributors, then we probably have a lot of |
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Java packages. If we don't have any, then you have the state we're in |
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now. We don't have limits on how many people we take, where we need |
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to prioritize how many people we "hire" for this or that. Ultimately |
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we accept anybody who meets the criteria. |
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|
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>> > It is a perverted structure no other projects have such a structure. Which |
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>> > is why others rise as Gentoo falls. |
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>> |
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>> This is a non-sequitur. |
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> |
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> Given I have never found any other business or project structured like Gentoo, |
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> it seems pretty accurate. Even Daniel said how things ended up is not what was |
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> intended. That is damn near the definition of perversion. |
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|
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I didn't say it wasn't "perverted." I said that your statement is a |
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non-sequitur. |
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|
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You suggest that the structure is the cause of us not being as great |
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as you think Gentoo would otherwise be. I don't think you've made a |
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convincing argument that a re-org is really going to change things. |
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|
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I've yet to see somebody say "I'd love to donate more of my |
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world-class effort to Gentoo, but man the way those Trustees work is |
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just so off-putting." Most candidate devs could care less about the |
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way the Trustees are set up. |
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|
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> |
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>> While I do think that some kind of reform might be beneficial, I don't |
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>> really see it having any significant impact on where Gentoo stands in |
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>> the "marketplace" of distros. |
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> |
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> Limited vision... Gentoo should be playing a major role in open source |
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> integration. |
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|
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Sounds great, but I don't see how its meta-structure is hindering this. |
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|
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> |
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> I cannot see him ever doing the quizzes, or going through the normal |
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> recruitment. In my opinion he should not have to. Gentoo should treat him as |
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> special and help get him on board. |
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|
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Is he even interested in being a Gentoo developer? What is in it for |
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him? And if it is just altruism why couldn't he be bothered with the |
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quizzes? |
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|
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> |
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> For FOSS development, next to like maybe BSD, there is not really much better |
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> than Gentoo... |
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> |
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|
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No argument. So, if we've already conquered the world, what is the problem? |
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|
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I think there are various reasons that it might be ideal to fix the |
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meta-structure. However, I don't think it will improve much in how |
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the day-to-day Gentoo experience is felt, and it could very well be a |
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distraction from other things that actually do improve the day-to-day |
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experience. The things you're expressing concerns about (few people |
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care about maintaining Java in the Gentoo repo) aren't going to be |
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solved by changing how the Foundation works. It isn't like re-orging |
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the Foundation/Council is going to make the CoC go away, or that the |
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values of a majority of the devs are going to change when they vote |
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for whoever ends up being in charge. |
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|
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-- |
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Rich |