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On Tue, Apr 6, 2010 at 10:26 PM, Butterworth, John W. < |
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jbutterworth@×××××.org> wrote: |
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> Hi. I have a security-related question for Portage/rsync: |
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> |
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> If someone makes a change to a copy of a program (say a backdoor added to |
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> apache) hosted on a public mirror, will the sync’ing between the public |
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> mirror and the main rotation mirror determine that it's corrupted (via 'bad' |
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> checksum) on the public-mirror side and replace it? |
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> |
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> |
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> |
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> If it's hosted @ Gentoo, if the main server is intact, the next sync will |
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overwrite the mirror-local copy |
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If it's not hosted on on Gentoo's mirror, Gentoo's sync'ing is unrelated |
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(and I understand that's the scenario you refer to) |
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Anyways, unless the *ebuild* was *also* poisoned (which can't happen by a |
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cracker changing stuff at apache.org), when you try to *emerge* the package, |
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emerge will fail because Portage verifies various different hash signatures |
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on the source files - which are embedded in the portage package tree [1]. |
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HTH, |
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-- Shimi |
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[1] Try: cat /usr/portage/www-servers/apache/Manifest |
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