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On Tuesday 09 November 2004 02:52 pm, William Yang wrote: |
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> Philipp Kern wrote: |
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> > On Tue, 2004-11-09 at 15:43, William Yang wrote: |
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> >>There's an awful lot of "intrusion prevention" or "active response IDS" |
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> >>[and insert your favorite en-vogue terminology] out there in the market, |
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> >>and people buy it. |
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> > |
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> > Yes. But the software you mentioned doesn't block your own hosts as a |
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> > simple shellscript would do. That's what the original poster wanted... a |
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> > more or less ``simple'' script to parse /var/log/secure and block the |
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> > IPs using iptables. |
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> |
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> Uhm... I suppose I read the request a little less literally. It seems |
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> pretty clear -- at least to me -- that the original poster's idea is to |
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> limit ssh port probing using the features of the kernel-level firewall. |
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> "Simple" seems to be a somewhat relative term here. I take simple to |
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> be "the smallest amount of logic needed to accomplish the goal with the |
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> fewest adverse effects" rather than "the smallest amount of logic |
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> possible." |
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That would be correct. SSH and the iptables rules are already configured to |
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do sojme handling on spoofed packets, so the utility of this type of active |
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defense as a DoS attack is pretty limited. I suppose if I really wanted to |
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avoid possible DoS, I could add a rule chain before the INPUT chain that |
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explicitly allowed my IP's and sent all the packets past the INPUT chain to |
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the rule chain that defines more fine-grained access corntrol. I jsut don't |
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see DoS as a real threat, since the packets need to hadshake before the login |
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can progress anyway, wihch requires a real routable address, presumably |
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outside my network. |
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|
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- Brian |
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|
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-- |
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