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Hi |
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On Sun, Nov 07, 2004 at 03:49:22PM +0000, Kurt Lieber wrote: |
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> On Sun, Nov 07, 2004 at 04:44:32PM +0100 or thereabouts, Peter Simons wrote: |
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> > I think it is important to stress that everybody is on the |
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> > same side here. The important thing right now is how to |
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> > _fix_ this problem. As I see it, the simplest possible |
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> > solution is this: |
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> > (1) Run "find /usr/portage -type f | xargs sha1sum -b" on |
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> > the Gentoo main system. |
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> > (2) Sign the output with GPG. |
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> > (3) Put it into the portage tree. |
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> > (4) If the user has GPG installed and has manually put the |
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> > appropriate public key in some place _outside_ of the |
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> > portage tree, have "emerge sync" verify that the |
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> > signature is intact and all hashes hold. |
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> People place way to much reliance on GPG and other public/private key |
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> systems... |
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I see your message is signed :) I use the ASCII one below, he he. |
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The reliance on those are justified though, I think. |
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IMHO the weak link in security is always people and procedures, not the math |
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or the crypto. This suggestion improves the procedure and lessens the |
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number of people at a low cost (if the developers/sysadm in question |
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agree). It could be tested, eventually made the default, and the option |
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retained not to use it. That is probably crucial since some developers |
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will have variations on the standard user setup. |
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> Let's assume we implement the above steps. What does that buy you? How do |
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> you know how many people have a copy of the private key used to sign that |
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> data? How do you know what sort of passphrase is used on it? (or if it |
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> even has a passphrase) How do you know the box that holds the private key |
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> is secure? |
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Gentoo publishes on their website the number of people who has this? |
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> Most importantly, how do you know when to stop? At some point, you're |
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> going to have to accept some level of risk. |
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When it is too much effort for the security gain. I can't really judge, |
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but the above suggestion seems easy. Security is a trafe-off, due credit |
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to Bruce Schneier. It's a process, and this thread might lead to above |
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implementation, after some review and discussion on list. Seems like |
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meta-objection to me, one about the process, which I think actually |
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works fine. That's not only why I use open source, it is why I |
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aggresively advocate it. |
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Much of this thread has been meta-discussion: Is it a problem?, should |
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it be fixed?, etc. It was refreshing to see the above suggestion to a |
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solution. Is it a good one? |
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cheers, |
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Jan |
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-- |
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.~. |
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/V\ Jan Groenewald |
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/( )\ http://www.aims.ac.za/ |
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^^-^^ |
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|
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-- |
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