Gentoo Archives: gentoo-security

From: Peter Hjalmarsson <xake@×××××××××.net>
To: gentoo-security@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-security] Kernel Security + KISS
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 09:54:15
Message-Id: 1203587649.8608.34.camel@flyttis
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-security] Kernel Security + KISS by Eduardo Tongson
1 AFAICS the thing missing is a leader. Someone to make a starting point
2 for the followers to make use of (not necessary inside of gentoo, I
3 believe it can always be integrated later if there are devs enough to
4 pick things up and integrate), a place for him to collect and keep list
5 and contact with interested people (also to keep "me too"-noise from
6 this list).
7
8 This does not even have to be a integrated gentoo solution, am I right?
9 Anybody having a hosting space could host a db with the
10 information/advisories.
11 And the hosting one could let anyone he/she trusts write info to that
12 db.
13 That db could be like "This vournable exists, these are the problems,
14 these are the workarounds/patches and there are no fixed kernel
15 versions/these kernel versions are fixed" where info could be updated as
16 they get along.
17 And anybody that has the time and skill could write a applications that
18 fetch info from this db about the currently running kernel and presents
19 the user with the text "No known vournables" or "These vournables
20 exists" with links to the information in the db about that advisory.
21 This way a user can run the application, get a message, read the
22 advisories and decide "I need to update to at least this version" or "I
23 do not need to update".
24
25 The thing needed after that is persons to keep this db up to date and
26 maybe bug devs to get fixed versions into portage.
27 But these people needs a central collection point where they could
28 "meet" and start moving things.
29
30 And anybody can bug any dev in bugzilla if a kernel is not fixed, but
31 the chances over-worked devs will notice and be more helpful if you are
32 more helpful with what, when and why this kernel thing should be fixed
33 (i.e. come well prepared).
34
35
36 tor 2008-02-21 klockan 11:16 +0800 skrev Eduardo Tongson:
37 > Alright how do we proceed to get this team started.
38 >
39 > ed*eonsec
40 >
41 > On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 6:55 AM, Ned Ludd <solar@g.o> wrote:
42 > >
43 > >
44 > > On Wed, 2008-02-20 at 13:59 -0500, Harlan Lieberman-Berg wrote:
45 > > > On Sunday 17 February 2008 23:12:35 Robert Buchholz wrote:
46 > > > > On Sunday, 17. February 2008, Eduardo Tongson wrote:
47 > > > > > What specific kernel knowledge is needed to get a Kernel advisory up
48 > > > > > and running ?
49 > > > >
50 > > > > Between becoming aware of a vulnerability in Linux and drafting an advisory
51 > > > > for one or all kernel sources comes the part where you review which
52 > > > > versions of which kernel sources are affected and unaffected. You also
53 > > > > need to pay attention to specifics of the added patchsets, which might
54 > > > > duplicate vulnerabilities.
55 > > > >
56 > > > > Parts of the job can indeed be done without Kernel and C knowledge, but
57 > > > > some cannot. So if we draft a new kernel security *team*, people without C
58 > > > > and kernel knowledge are helpful -- some others need to have it, though.
59 > > > >
60 > > > > Robert
61 > > >
62 > > > To be honest, 99% of what is done in the kernel security team can be done with
63 > > > no C knowledge at all.
64 > > >
65 > > > I'm not an expert C person - far from it - but I eventually became the head of
66 > > > Kernel Security until I retired a few months ago.
67 > > >
68 > > > Most of it is bug handling. The major problem is a social, not a technical
69 > > > one. Because of the manner in which our kernels are organized, a single
70 > > > vulnerability involves checking upstream version numbers, coordinating them
71 > > > into our downstream version numbers for all sources, checking to see if the
72 > > > sources are effected, figuring out who to CC for the bugs, then harassing
73 > > > them until they do it.
74 > > >
75 > > > Unlike other security sources, any attempt to hardmask the package is shutdown
76 > > > instantly. The chaos that would result from a kernel hardmask, even one of
77 > > > the lesser used ones, caused me to only successfully order one over my entire
78 > > > career in Gentoo Kernsec... even though more around 30 would have been
79 > > > needed. It is not infrequently that bugs will last six months without any
80 > > > action coming about them, and users are blissfully unaware.
81 > > >
82 > > > I am happy to give my input as the former head of Kernel Security, but it is
83 > > > my personal opinion that any advances in kernel security will require the
84 > > > full cooperation of security, and letting the head of kernel security be able
85 > > > to actually enforce threats, as that seems to be the only way bugs ever get
86 > > > resolved. Pleading didn't work - I tried.
87 > > >
88 > > > -Harlan Lieberman-Berg
89 > > > Gentoo Developer Emeritus
90 > >
91 > >
92 > > Every word of what you said is painfully true. The only way to
93 > > accomplish this would be with an Iron Fist(fail) or a team of ~15 guys
94 > > who do nothing but patch and push new kernels and the PR that goes along
95 > > with them every few days.
96 > > --
97 > > Ned Ludd <solar@g.o>
98 > >
99 > >
100 > >
101 > > --
102 > > gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list
103 > >
104 > >

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Re: [gentoo-security] Kernel Security + KISS Eduardo Tongson <propolice@×××××.com>