Gentoo Archives: gentoo-security

From: Peter Simons <simons@××××.to>
To: gentoo-security@l.g.o
Subject: [gentoo-security] Re: Let's blow the whistle
Date: Mon, 08 Nov 2004 22:18:20
Message-Id: 87mzxshu71.fsf@peti.cryp.to
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-security] Re: Let's blow the whistle by Marius Mauch
1 Marius Mauch writes:
2
3 >> (1) Run "find /usr/portage -type f | xargs sha1sum -b"
4 >> on the Gentoo main system.
5
6 > What's the 'Gentoo main system'?
7
8 The one that carries the authoritative portage tree which
9 the secondary systems mirror.
10
11
12 >> (2) Sign the output with GPG.
13
14 > Who does that?
15
16 A script? I already commented on the problem of entering the
17 pass phrase, so I won't repeat it.
18
19
20 > Basically we do that already with Manifests, just that
21 > they don't cover the whole tree (yet).
22
23 Right. And the fact that they don't cover the whole tree is
24 exactly the problem I am talking about.
25
26
27 > signing of eclasses/profiles isn't done because of policy
28 > details
29
30 How long do you estimate will it take to get these problems
31 sorted out?
32
33
34 > But signature verification is a completely different
35 > beast.
36
37 The signatures have to be verified manually anyway, at least
38 initially. So I am fine with Portage not doing it for me as
39 long as the signatures _exist_.
40
41
42 > You want to make a huge list with checksums for all files
43 > and then sign that file. The major problem is that a)
44 > this list would have to be regenerated at every commit or
45 > at least each rsync update,
46
47 You can use the CVSROOT/* hooks to regenerate only the
48 hashes for those files that have actually changed. And that
49 "huge" file is more like 7 MB.
50
51
52 > b) signing would have to be automated which is pretty
53 > much a no-go
54
55 It is a lot better than not signing at all, IMHO. I also
56 commented on this before, so I won't repeat it.
57
58
59 > c) it would have to be done on the cvs server or the
60 > master rsync mirror, both are AFAIK already pretty loaded
61 > boxes.
62
63 Hashes can be regenerated incrementally; creating the
64 signature takes less than a second. Any decent system should
65 be able to survive that, IMHO. Should this turn out to be
66 absolutely *impossible*, then I guess you'll need a hardware
67 upgrade no matter what kind of authentication scheme you
68 would like to implement.
69
70
71 > the rsync update interval is 30 minutes and other actions
72 > have to be performed in that window that probably
73 > interfere with the checksum generation.
74
75 On my machine, which is not very fast at all, the entire
76 hash file can be regenerated from the scratch in about 4
77 minutes. So even if it takes 10 minutes on the Gentoo
78 system, that still leaves plenty of time for the other
79 tasks. It does require some attention to detail that these
80 processes don't interfere with each other, though. I guess
81 one would have to _try_ it.
82
83 Peter
84
85
86 --
87 gentoo-security@g.o mailing list

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-security] Re: Let's blow the whistle Anthony Metcalf <anthony.metcalf@×××××××××××.cx>