Gentoo Archives: gentoo-security

From: Bill Moritz <ego@××××××××××.com>
To: Bill Kenworthy <billk@×××××××××.au>
Cc: gentoo-security-return-565-ego=djalterego.com@g.o, gentoo-security List <gentoo-security@g.o>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-security] Changes to traceroute in newest release
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2003 20:28:42
Message-Id: 20031217021309.M85499@djalterego.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-security] Changes to traceroute in newest release by Bill Kenworthy
1 > Or to turn it around, on a user managed workstation its both
2 > inconvenient and adds little to security. In fact, its easiest to just
3 > keep a root window open and run it from there - which is insecure if
4 > you walk away and leave it running.
5 >
6 > The point I am trying to make is that forcing useful tools to run as
7 > root for everyone makes little sense on a user managed workstation
8 > and can be counter-productive as above when users just work around
9 > the restrictions in an insecure manner.
10
11 If you produced a product, would you want it to be considered secure or
12 insecure out of the box? I think anyone currently looking at the various
13 worms and virii bombarding thier internet connections can answer that one.
14 I personally would rather have a secure product. With Gentoo, who's theme
15 is "totally configurable", the product will only be as insecure as you make
16 it.
17
18 > Perhaps a "secure_options" use flag to cater for those who work in
19 > multiuser/insecure environments? I would rather not suffer an unusable
20 > system because a few users have special requirements.
21
22 I think we should call it the "insecure_worm-promoting_microsoftesc_options"
23 use flag. Once again, typing sudo really isn't that big of an
24 inconvienece. You could even write an alias for traceroute to
25 exec "sudo /usr/sbin/traceroute".
26
27 -bill
28 > BillK
29 > On Wed, 2003-12-17 at 09:16, Bill Moritz wrote:
30 > > > SUID exploits are based on the premise that you've already access to
31 > > > the system in question. If you don't trust people with accounts on
32 > > > your system, they shouldn't have it.
33 > >
34 > > What about people that run shell servers? Should I have an interview
35 > > process and a background check on anyone that wants to pay for access to
36 my
37 > > systems?
38 > >
39 > > > Just another $.02
40 > > >
41 > > > -d
42 > >
43 > > -bill
44 > >
45 > > --
46 > > gentoo-security@g.o mailing list
47 >
48 > --
49 > gentoo-security@g.o mailing list
50 ------- End of Original Message -------
51
52
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