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What I don't understand then is the problem with security of ebuilds. If we |
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can validate that the MD5 hash is consistent with the published hash, then |
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the package would be considered secure and case is effectively closed? |
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Right? |
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----- Original Message ----- |
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From: "Heikki Levanto" <heikki@×××.dk> |
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To: <gentoo-security@l.g.o> |
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Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 1:01 AM |
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Subject: Re: [gentoo-security] Thoughts on Package Security |
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|
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> On Mon, 2004-02-16 at 22:20, Brian Klauss wrote: |
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> > Why not take package security one step deeper to ensure the validity |
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> > of every ebuild and source-tree? |
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> > |
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> > Instead of relying upon a master hash of the compressed package, |
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> > create a hash for each source file, documentation, makefile, etc. |
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> |
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> Sorry, I don't see what that would give. If the md5 of the compressed |
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> archive is fine, then we know already that it has not been tampered |
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> with. Ergo, all contained files are fine. |
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> |
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> (except for the theoretical possibility of md5-sum collision, which is |
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> unlikely to an astronomical degree, and not worth worrying about in real |
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> world) |
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> |
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> Heikki |
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> |
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> -- |
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> Heikki Levanto LSD - Levanto Software Development <heikki@×××.dk> |
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> |
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> |
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> -- |
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> gentoo-security@g.o mailing list |
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> |
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> |
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> |
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-- |
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