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>> I read about this vulnerability in the |
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>> 2015-04-06-apache-addhandler-addtype Gentoo news item. I don't think |
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>> I'm using any functionality that could expose me to the problem but |
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>> I'd like to be able to say so for sure. Does the fact that I'm |
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>> up-to-date with GLSAs, I don't have PHP5 in APACHE2_OPTS (I use |
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>> php-fpm), along with the following (which I think is default) indicate |
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>> that I'm not vulnerable? |
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> |
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> (1) Do you allow untrusted people to upload files to your server? |
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> |
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> (2) If so, do you try to prevent them from uploading PHP files |
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> based on a regular expression or shell glob? |
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> |
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> Unless you answer "yes" to both of those questions, you don't need to |
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> check anything. |
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> |
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> The vulnerability is that with, |
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> |
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> AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .php |
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> |
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> Apache will go ahead and try to execute (for example) foo.php.html. If |
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> you're blocking uploads of *.php to prevent people from uploading PHP |
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> scripts, then I could name my file foo.php.html and bypass your restriction. |
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> |
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> The AddHandler behavior was documented, but incredibly unexpected -- and |
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> we had it in the default configuration. The new config we ship uses, |
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> |
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> <FilesMatch "\.php$"> |
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> SetHandler application/x-httpd-php |
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> </FilesMatch> |
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> |
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> instead so only *.php files get executed. |
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|
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|
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Thank you Michael. |
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|
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- Grant |