Gentoo Archives: gentoo-user

From: Matthias Bethke <matthias@×××××××.de>
To: gentoo-user@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] (OT) Freezing: does encryption become useless?
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2008 21:14:02
Message-Id: 20080226211359.GF7190@aldous
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-user] (OT) Freezing: does encryption become useless? by Volker Hemmann
1 Hi Volker,
2 on Sat, Feb 23, 2008 at 10:15:22PM +0100, you wrote:
3 > > http://iht.com/articles/2008/02/22/technology/chip.php
4 >
5 > don't panic. Just because something works in a lab, does not mean that it
6 > works outside of it too. So they were able to freeze some ram and get some
7 > information of it. So what? First of all - how man times will someone be able
8 > to steal a computer and freeze its ram seconds after it was shut of? Who
9 > guarantees that the decayed parts are not the ones holding the key? even a
10 > couple of flipped bits make the data useless. And who guarantees that the
11 > dram survives the forces when it is cooled down in tens of seconds and heated
12 > up (through the current) afterwards?
13
14 I agree with the "don't panic" part but not your reasons for it. There
15 is a real danger for *some* of us but it's fairly easy to circumvent for
16 most.
17 How often will someone be able to steal a computer with live key
18 material in RAM? Well, how many laptops are being carried around
19 suspended to RAM? A pretty large percentage of them I suppose. So far,
20 if you didn't have a screen saver with an exploitable buffer overflow
21 (very very unlikely) or an unprotected IEEE1394 port (unlikely on Linux
22 today) the attacker's only chance to get at the data was to cut the
23 power, boot some other media and attack the disk, and with AES or
24 similar encryption that chance was not very good. Now you can leave the
25 power on, dump a can of cooling spray on the SO-DIMM (they easily
26 survive that, you can take your time with the power on), then take it
27 out, drop it in liquid N and take it home (you could do that before of
28 course, but it's widely know now ;)
29 And a couple of flipped bits are no obstacle at all for a cryptoanalyst.
30 A computer that can brute-force 10^11 keys a second needs an average of
31 ~5*10^19 years to crack a 128 bit key. With 8 random flipped bits in an
32 otherwise intact key it should come down to less than five days which I
33 think is a pretty good gain. Makes it viable for people who might just
34 be after some blueprints[0], not just the NSA with super duper UFO
35 technology.
36 So if you have sensitive data on a laptop, make sure you don't leave it
37 in suspend-to-RAM where it could be stolen. If it's a stationary
38 unsupervised machine it should have a good chassis intrusion alarm that
39 cuts the power and/or overwrites memory. That's pretty much what people
40 can do on their own now----if they think it's worth it of course.
41
42 cheers,
43 Matthias
44
45 [0] That's not to say this couldn't be a Good Thing in the end what
46 with all the patent BS going on.
47 --
48 I prefer encrypted and signed messages. KeyID: FAC37665
49 Fingerprint: 8C16 3F0A A6FC DF0D 19B0 8DEF 48D9 1700 FAC3 7665