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Hi Volker, |
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on Sat, Feb 23, 2008 at 10:15:22PM +0100, you wrote: |
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> > http://iht.com/articles/2008/02/22/technology/chip.php |
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> |
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> don't panic. Just because something works in a lab, does not mean that it |
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> works outside of it too. So they were able to freeze some ram and get some |
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> information of it. So what? First of all - how man times will someone be able |
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> to steal a computer and freeze its ram seconds after it was shut of? Who |
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> guarantees that the decayed parts are not the ones holding the key? even a |
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> couple of flipped bits make the data useless. And who guarantees that the |
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> dram survives the forces when it is cooled down in tens of seconds and heated |
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> up (through the current) afterwards? |
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|
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I agree with the "don't panic" part but not your reasons for it. There |
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is a real danger for *some* of us but it's fairly easy to circumvent for |
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most. |
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How often will someone be able to steal a computer with live key |
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material in RAM? Well, how many laptops are being carried around |
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suspended to RAM? A pretty large percentage of them I suppose. So far, |
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if you didn't have a screen saver with an exploitable buffer overflow |
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(very very unlikely) or an unprotected IEEE1394 port (unlikely on Linux |
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today) the attacker's only chance to get at the data was to cut the |
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power, boot some other media and attack the disk, and with AES or |
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similar encryption that chance was not very good. Now you can leave the |
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power on, dump a can of cooling spray on the SO-DIMM (they easily |
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survive that, you can take your time with the power on), then take it |
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out, drop it in liquid N and take it home (you could do that before of |
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course, but it's widely know now ;) |
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And a couple of flipped bits are no obstacle at all for a cryptoanalyst. |
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A computer that can brute-force 10^11 keys a second needs an average of |
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~5*10^19 years to crack a 128 bit key. With 8 random flipped bits in an |
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otherwise intact key it should come down to less than five days which I |
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think is a pretty good gain. Makes it viable for people who might just |
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be after some blueprints[0], not just the NSA with super duper UFO |
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technology. |
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So if you have sensitive data on a laptop, make sure you don't leave it |
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in suspend-to-RAM where it could be stolen. If it's a stationary |
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unsupervised machine it should have a good chassis intrusion alarm that |
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cuts the power and/or overwrites memory. That's pretty much what people |
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can do on their own now----if they think it's worth it of course. |
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|
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cheers, |
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Matthias |
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|
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[0] That's not to say this couldn't be a Good Thing in the end what |
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with all the patent BS going on. |
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-- |
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I prefer encrypted and signed messages. KeyID: FAC37665 |
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Fingerprint: 8C16 3F0A A6FC DF0D 19B0 8DEF 48D9 1700 FAC3 7665 |