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Jorge Aleida wrote |
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> >Technically this is incorrect, anyone that can read and write to this |
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> >socket can authenticate using the keys, but they can't read the key |
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> >material directly. They can also engage in a known-plaintext or |
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> |
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> OK, that's what I thought. But a troian running with the normal user |
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> permissions could get the keys by reading the temporary directory (not |
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> by connecting to the socket). Is this right? Or are the keys protected |
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> in some other way? For example, keys might be kept encrypted and then |
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> decrypted on demand using the passphrase provided when the key was |
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> added, assuming the passphrase was kept on protected memory. |
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That's why some people build public keys as root on a desktop but try |
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to do everything else like browsing or reading mail as user. |
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ralf |
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-- |
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