Gentoo Archives: gentoo-user

From: james <garftd@×××××××.net>
To: gentoo-user@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] What's with all these "acct-group" ebuilds recently?
Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2020 02:18:54
Message-Id: 70b3a5c0-0764-0dd3-6daf-e0ee23b9b7de@verizon.net
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-user] What's with all these "acct-group" ebuilds recently? by Rich Freeman
1 On 6/26/20 4:40 PM, Rich Freeman wrote:
2 > On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 4:03 PM james <garftd@×××××××.net> wrote:
3 >>
4 >> So can some of the smarter (gentoo) folks illuminate how to totally
5 >> avoid groups and users, except for the minimum required, application
6 >> specific? For example like serial line tools, or outline a set of
7 >> tweaks/setting to avoid these altogether?
8 >>
9 >
10 > IMO if extra security is your goal then if anything you want to have
11 > MORE use of users rather than less. Everything should be least
12 > privilege, and usually that means having separate UIDs for everything,
13 > and then layering on stuff like namespaces/SELinux/capabilities/etc on
14 > top of that to further tailor things.
15
16 OK, that's a pathway forward, that I no longer believe in, though viable.
17
18 I think the days of systems design and implementation, that require a
19 default, multi-user, scenario, are arcane and subject to many attack
20 vectors. Granted many will and do disagree, and new pathways are rarely
21 well lighted in my experiences.
22
23
24
25 > Of course the more config you have like this, the more there is to
26 > audit. However, you also have to consider the failure mode. When you
27 > have layers of security and some layer fails, chances are that the
28 > failure still results in more containment than what you would have had
29 > if you didn't build the layers in the first place.
30
31 Security Schema are many and all are under attack. Most of what I need
32 from a 'well behaved' collective of microprocessors and microcontrollers
33 are in-house and need little (data) from the outside. The need to share
34 outside is nice, but can be limited, dynamically for a wide variety of
35 reason. The deep desire to share, in part-and-parcel, is to be human.
36 For me, as a christian, its far deeper of a need, but that on me. Quick
37 and automated shut-off, is a concept I like very, very much.
38
39 Currently, the need to be able to "snap my fingers" and instantly
40 isolate, is mostly prevented because our USA government forces chip
41 manufacturers to put "bullshit and backdoors" into most all processors
42 and controllers. That shit has to STOP. They, including our F. Feds do
43 not have that right. If we do not fix this, SATAN gets control; hence
44 the end-times are upon us, like a thief in the night. That's my belief
45 and I know many that think it is too late, to fix. the first step is to
46 have 100% of critical systems components manufactured in the USA. Each
47 country can and should do their own thing. Leaders have now realized,
48 letting folks that rule the large corporations, "have it their way" has
49 landed up in a pile of problems.
50
51
52
53 > Now, one thing that would result in fewer UIDs is installing less
54 > stuff. Maybe that is what you're getting at, and of course reducing
55 > the attack surface is a good thing. However, keep in mind that a UID
56 > in /etc/passwd doesn't actually do anything if no process runs with
57 > that UID - it is just a line in a text file. So, having a uucp group
58 > when no processes have access to it doesn't really cause issues.
59
60 unless the remotes can inject into that causal hardware relationship and
61 exploit it? Who knows what lurks in them micro-codes of silicon these
62 days.... much of the hardware has hidden Rf channels, well hidden and it
63 requires quite expensive systems that the semiconductor companies
64 provide, mostly to governments, on a use-to-be limited basis. That's why
65 the USA is forcing AMD to bring 7-nm manufacturing to US soil, so they
66 are under USA rule-sets. Makes the Mafia look like choir boys......
67
68 here's one publicized:
69 https://www.zdnet.com/article/minix-intels-hidden-in-chip-operating-system/
70
71
72 and a bit deeper:
73
74 https://freetechsforum.com/minix-%E2%80%8Bintels-hidden-chip-operating-system/
75
76 > Removing the group doesn't actually make things more secure, because
77 > processes can use a gid even if it doesn't exist in /etc/groups.
78 > Effectively any POSIX system has every uid/gid available even if there
79 > is no /etc/passwd at all.
80
81
82 And that is coded into the parts of the kernel, we cannot eliminate?
83 Typical sploits?
84
85 Curiously, a bit deeper explanation?
86 I'm no expert at this stuff, but I am very interested to hear more, from
87 your perspective and experiences which you are comfortable sharing.
88
89
90 James

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