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On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 4:50 PM, Dale <rdalek1967@×××××.com> wrote: |
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> |
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> have we profited on today'. However, when a company is public, stocks |
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> and such, then it is about what have we made today with no one caring |
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> about years from now. After all, the people owning the stocks may not |
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> even own them next week. |
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> |
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Nor should they be concerned with the long-term. This should be the |
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role of the regulator. If the regulator wants spare capacity, then |
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they should take bids for companies to have spare capacity available |
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and they get paid to just sit on their excess capacity. If the |
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regulator wants more redundancy in the transmission network then they |
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should set specifications for what is desired and take bids from those |
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able to build it out. If the regulator wants everything to be |
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replaced within a certified lifetime based on testing then they should |
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specify this, and take bids from those willing to maintain the grid to |
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this standard. |
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The problem is that the general public does not see the value in |
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infrastructure, so they don't think about it when they're voting. |
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Instead they vote based on whatever fringe issues the politicians want |
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them to focus on instead. |
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If a company is going to get paid the same whether they build for |
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extra reliability or not, they're going to opt not to. Not only does |
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this give them more profits, but it makes their bids more competitive |
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vs some other company that would just undercut them for |
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"over-providing." |
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Lax regulation just punishes conscientious market participants. |
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-- |
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Rich |