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On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 6:05 AM, Michael Orlitzky <michael@××××××××.com>wrote: |
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> The CA infrastructure was never secure. It exists to transfer money away |
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> from website owners and into the bank accounts of the CAs and browser |
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> makers. Security may be one of their goals, but it's certainly not the |
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> motivating one. |
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> |
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Well, at least CAcert doesn't exist for money. |
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> |
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> To avoid a tirade here, I've already written about this: |
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> |
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> [1] |
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> |
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> http://michael.orlitzky.com/articles/in_defense_of_self-signed_certificates.php |
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> |
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> [2] |
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> |
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> http://michael.orlitzky.com/articles/why_im_against_ca-signed_certificates.php |
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> |
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> |
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I've got a question about Gentoo in this case. If we assume that stage3 is |
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trusted, does portage check that mirrors are trusted? I'm not sure about |
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this. But if it does, then distfiles checksums are also checked, so they |
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are trusted, too. In this case you could trust a running browser. Until |
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your system becomes compromised in other ways. |
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This would be OS packaging system problem, not the problem with CA-->user |
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trust model. |
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