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On 8/21/20 11:54 AM, Caveman Al Toraboran wrote: |
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> thanks. highly appreciate your time. to save space i'll skip parts |
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> where i fully agree with/happily-learned. |
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You're welcome. |
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> (e.g. loop detection; good reminder, i wasn't thinking about it. |
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> plus didn't know of acronyms DSN, MDNs, etc; nice keywords for |
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> further googing). |
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;-) |
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> i was thinking (and still) if such relay-by-relay delivery increases |
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> probability of error by a factor of n (n = number of relays in the |
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> middle). e.g. probability of accidental silent mail loss is if one, |
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> or more, accidentally said "yes got it!" but actually didn't. i.e.: |
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It definitely won't be a factor of n, where n is the number of relays. |
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> i wonder if it would be better if only the entry relay aims at the |
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> confirmation from the terminal server? this way we won't need to |
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> assume that relays in the middle are honouring their guarantees, |
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> hence the probability above would be smaller since k is limited up |
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> to 2 despite n's growth. |
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Nope. |
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Each and every server MUST behave the same way. |
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> care to point part of the rfc that defines "safe" commit to disk? |
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> e.g. how far does the rfc expect us to go? should we execute `sync`'s |
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> equivalent to ensure that data is actually written on disk and is |
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> not in operating system's file system write buffer? |
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TL;DR: Yes on all accounts. |
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See the recent reply about guarantee and relays for more details. |
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> onion signatures? e.g. message is wrapped around several layers of |
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> signatures for every relay in the path? |
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That doesn't help the problem. We sort of have an onion already. |
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It's quite likely possible to validate the signature of the immediate |
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sending server. But how does the receiving server know how to undo any |
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modifications that the immediate sending server made to be able to |
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validate the previous sending server's signature? Rinse, later, repeat |
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out multiple levels. |
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What if some of the servers signs what they send vs what they receive? |
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These are the types of problems that don't currently have a solution. |
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> e.g. whitelisting, tagging, spam filtration, prioritizing, etc, |
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> based on entities that onion-signed the message. |
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How is doing those things based on signature different than doing them |
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based on the system sending to you? |
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The only thing that comes to mind is trusting an upstream signature, but |
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not the immediate sending system. But, you have to unwrap the onion to |
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be able to validate the signature. But to do that you need to know what |
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the server(s) downstream of the signature being validated did to the |
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message. |
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Some of this is a one way trap door without any indication of what each |
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trap door did to the message. |
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-- |
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Grant. . . . |
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unix || die |
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