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On Mon, Mar 21, 2022 at 12:17 PM Laurence Perkins <lperkins@×××××××.net> wrote: |
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> There was the ORWL project a few years ago. Self-encrypting SSD drive with a TPM that would unlock it only in the presence of an encrypted RFID tag plus tapping in a code on the keypad, with all the sensitive bits wrapped in an active mesh system that would destroy the data if it detected any tampering. |
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While I can see this being useful if for some reason you don't have |
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support for encryption on the software side, something like this seems |
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like it wouldn't actually solve the unattended boot problem, since you |
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have to enter a PIN. If you don't require the PIN and leave the RFID |
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tag sitting next to the drive all the time, then anybody can walk in |
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and take the drive and the tag and then read the data off the drive |
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bypassing the OS. So it offers at best the same protection as a LUKS |
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passphrase entered at boot, and at worst no protection at all. It |
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would have the advantage that you wouldn't be able to attack the |
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passphrase itself as no doubt the PIN only offers limited attempts and |
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would be very difficult to bypass. |
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The advantage of the TPM in the computer is that you can do unattended |
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verified boot, so the disk can only be decrypted if the OS boots |
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normally without tampering. Obviously you're still open to OS |
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vulnerabilities, but the drive itself cannot be accessed except via |
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the OS. The TPM chip can actually supervise the boot process. |
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Still an interesting product though. I could see it being useful if |
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you had to run some specific OS that doesn't support disk encryption |
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natively. |
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-- |
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Rich |