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I just fell in love with Intel a bit more. |
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Aisha |
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blog.aisha.cc |
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|
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On 2020-03-06 14:39, Rich Freeman wrote: |
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> On Fri, Mar 6, 2020 at 2:07 PM Wols Lists <antlists@××××××××××××.uk> |
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> wrote: |
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>> |
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>> On 06/03/20 13:48, Rich Freeman wrote: |
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>> > If you fall into this camp you need to still update your firmware to |
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>> > address the non-TPM-user and to avoid making it trivial for software |
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>> > to steal your keys/etc. However, you need to be aware that you are no |
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>> > longer secure against physical theft of your device. Somebody who |
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>> > steals your laptop with passwordless encryption might be able to break |
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>> > the encryption on your device. |
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>> |
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>> It's worse that that, he's dead, Jim! |
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>> |
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>> The summary on LWN is an easy read. Somebody who steals your Intel |
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>> laptop WILL be able to break the encryption on your device. |
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>> |
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>> tl;dr summary - the microcode that *boots* the cpu has been |
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>> compromised. |
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>> So even while it is setting up tpm and all that malarkey, malware can |
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>> be |
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>> stealing keys etc. |
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> |
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> They don't detail the effort required. If the firmware is patched it |
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> sounds like it still requires tinkering with hardware. However, there |
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> really isn't nothing you said that doesn't agree with what I said. |
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> |
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> Whether they "WILL" be able to break the encryption on your device |
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> depends a lot on the details and the knowledge of the attacker. Hence |
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> the reason I said "might." In any case, might is good enough to not |
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> rely on a broken security feature. |
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> |
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>> Which means that Intel's master signing key will soon be cracked and |
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>> compromised. |
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> |
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> Yes, but keep in mind the signing keys have nothing to do with disk |
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> encryption. It is for remote attestation. Hence my Netflix comment. |