Gentoo Archives: gentoo-user

From: Alan McKinnon <alan.mckinnon@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-user@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] Risks of making traceroute suid root
Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 09:19:22
Message-Id: d4df9713-7fc4-a57d-94f0-91ed2883d205@gmail.com
In Reply to: [gentoo-user] Risks of making traceroute suid root by Adam Carter
1 On 11/05/2017 01:49, Adam Carter wrote:
2 > I want to allow some fairly well trusted users the ablilty to do traces
3 > with icmp. I can give them sudo, but how high is the risk of making
4 > traceroute suid root? AFAIK making text editors or anything that has an
5 > ability to run shell commands suid root is effectively giving them root
6 > access, but other than exploiting vulnerabilities in traceroute itself,
7 > are there any other issues?
8
9 You have at least 3 approaches
10
11 1. suid root. If you err on the side of the binary probably being OK,
12 you will probably be fine. I don't know of any issues with traceroute, I
13 have many systems where it ships suid root without issue (like ping)
14
15 2. sudo, which frankly is a monumental PITA to maintain - it tends to
16 grow and bloat and the syntax isn't easy to parse in your mind. It also
17 doesn't let you give users access to a certain thing, you have to come
18 up with all the commands that do that, then figure out a regex that
19 matches what you want and nothing you don't want. A real PITA
20
21 3. Capabilities, like John said. Ideally this is what you really want.
22 User's can't run traceroute because they can't open raw sockets.
23 Capabilities let you give them that permission, deftly avoiding
24 questions as to the vuln status of the traceroute binary
25
26 --
27 Alan McKinnon
28 alan.mckinnon@×××××.com

Replies

Subject Author
[gentoo-user] Re: Risks of making traceroute suid root Ian Zimmerman <itz@×××××××.net>