Gentoo Archives: gentoo-user

From: Michael Mol <mikemol@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-user@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] Lockdown: free/open OS maker pays Microsoft ransom for the right to boot on users' computers
Date: Sat, 02 Jun 2012 23:38:33
Message-Id: CA+czFiBvLvnVY3ASs6BnLywREGEnkUs7QU-Q6H5ouaLV=mzPKw@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-user] Lockdown: free/open OS maker pays Microsoft ransom for the right to boot on users' computers by pk
1 On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 6:50 PM, pk <peterk2@××××××××.se> wrote:
2 > On 2012-06-02 22:10, Michael Mol wrote:
3
4 [snip]
5
6 >> It's also probable that the OS kernel can tell the UEFI BIOS about new
7 >> keys to blacklist. I expect that'll be a recurring thing in the
8 >> Monthly batch of security updates Microsoft puts out. (Makes sense,
9 >> really; if malware is using a key, blacklist that key.)
10 >
11 > Yes, would expect something like this. Secure boot supposedly prevents
12 > "unauthorized firmware, operating systems or UEFI drivers" at boot time.
13 > So if I interpret this correctly it would mean that if I have, say, an
14 > old graphics card with an old firmware (vga bios) I can't use it with
15 > "secure boot".
16
17 It's probable that a system using an IOMMU and virtualization tech
18 could emulate the real-mode requirements needed to execute that VGA
19 BIOS safely.
20
21 Gets more interesting...my understanding of things like Firewire is
22 that it's almost trivially easy to crack a system on the bus, because
23 of the way DMA is implemented.
24
25 > More interestingly, how is an "operating system" defined?
26 > Does it mean only the kernel itself or does it mean a full-blown OS with
27 > init and other supporting software?
28
29 The BIOS will only load a signed bootloader. The signed bootloader
30 will only load a signed kernel. The signed kernel will...do whatever
31 you tell it to do.
32
33 > What does that mean to a source based "distro"?
34
35 It's going to make building and installing grub and the kernel
36 trickier; you'll have to get them signed. And that's going to be a
37 PITA for anyone who does developers.
38
39 What it *really* means is that someone who wants to run Linux as a
40 hobbyist or developer is going to disable "SecureBoot", and then fall
41 back to business as usual.
42
43 > Also, I would assume a legitimate key would be able to
44 > sign pretty much any binary so a key that Fedora uses could be used to
45 > sign malware for Windows, which then would be blacklisted by
46 > Microsoft...
47
48 If Fedora allows their key to sign crap, then their key will get revoked.
49
50 What I hope (I don't know) is whether or not the signing system
51 involved allows chaining. i.e., with SSL, I can generate my own key,
52 get it signed by a CA, and then bundle the CA's public key and my
53 public key when I go on to sign _another_ key.
54
55 So, could I generate a key, have Fedora sign it, and then use my key
56 to sign my binaries? If my key is used to do malicious things,
57 Fedora's off the hook, and it's only my key which gets revoked.
58
59 > and how is malware defined? Anything that would be
60 > detrimental to Microsoft?
61
62 Dunno. I imagine it comes down to whatever the chief key's owner
63 doesn't want running on the same hardware while SecureBoot is enabled.
64 Rootkits come to mind.
65
66 >
67 >> Someone linked to some absolutely terrible stuff being built into
68 >> Intel's Ivy Bridge...it's plausible it will be possible to deploy
69 >
70 > You mean:
71 > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_insider#Intel_Insider_and_remote-control
72 >
73 > ?
74
75 The vPro stuff relates, yeah.
76
77 >
78 >> blacklist key updates over the network within a couple years.
79 >
80 > Well, UEFI already implements remote management:
81 > http://www.uefi.org/news/UEFI_Overview.pdf (page 13)
82 > ... so implementing an automatic update over the network, preferably via
83 > SMM/SMI so that the operating system cannot intervene would be possible
84 > already today... and you've lost control of your computer.
85
86 You still own your network, so you have at least some control over it.
87 These features are intended to be managed by the system network
88 administrator.
89
90 This is going to be a matter of caveat emptor. Don't buy a Tivo or
91 Kindle and expect to be able to repurpose it. (And don't buy hardware
92 from Oracle, I expect. Though I suspect you may eventually not get a
93 choice is you want to run their software.)
94
95 If you don't know whether or not you can expect to reformat a device
96 before you buy it, then you haven't been paying attention to mobile
97 tech over the last five years, and you didn't do your homework.
98 Apologies for the lack of sympathy. :(
99
100 --
101 :wq

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