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On Thu, 28 Mar 2013 17:04:25 -0400 |
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Michael Mol <mikemol@×××××.com> wrote: |
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|
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> > |
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> >> listened to the dangers and even now simply redesigned DNSSEC. |
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> > |
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> > Or they could fudge it by making every request requiring padding |
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> > larger than the response. Bandwidth would increase astronomically |
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> > but amp attacks would have to find other avenues. |
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> > |
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> |
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> Infeasible; the requester cannot know the size of the response in |
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> advance. If a packet comes in, and the response is larger than the |
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> request, is it really an amp packet, did the client not know, or is |
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> the server misconfigured and not limiting the response data as much |
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> as it could? |
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I'm certainly not saying it's a good idea, hence the 'fudge' and 'making |
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every request' which would mean non updateable clients or non updated |
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routers (90%) needing special treatment. I'm sure there are probably |
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other hurdles to it but it is certainly possible to make a request much |
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larger than any potential response similar to the anti-spam system |
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that makes creating a message take a lot of cpu and then only accepting |
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messages from those that do (hsomething I think, only works too if all |
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take part but would eliminate spam almost completely). |
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However thinking about it, considering the want for dns to provide |
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larger things like encryption keys, huge requests may be the best long |
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term solution for a DNSSEC which seemingly refuses out of pride to add |
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something like DNSCURVE to prevent spoofing. Similar to firewalls only |
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sending a single syn ack (less than or equalise) |
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