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So you backup on harddrive, not tape and theses are not incremental |
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backups. |
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But my question about backup was not only for you but for all that |
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encrypt their servers. |
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The backup part is generally the weakest point. |
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Le 2014-06-02 13:58, Matti Nykyri a écrit : |
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> On Jun 2, 2014, at 15:36, godzil <godzil@××××××.net> wrote: |
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> |
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>> Le 2014-06-02 13:23, Matti Nykyri a écrit : |
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>>> On Jun 2, 2014, at 16:40, "J. Roeleveld" <joost@××××××××.org> wrote: |
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>>> Well i have a switch in the door of the server room. It opens when |
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>>> you |
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>>> open the door. That signals the kernel to wipe all the encryption |
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>>> keys |
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>>> from kernel memory. Without the keys there is no access to the disks. |
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>>> After that another kernel is executed which wipes the memory of the |
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>>> old kernel. If you just pull the plug memory will stay in its state |
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>>> for an unspecified time. |
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>>> Swap uses random keys. |
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>>> network switches and routers get power only after firewall-server is |
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>>> up and running. |
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>>> There is no easy way to enter the room without wipeing the encryption |
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>>> keys. Booting up the server requires that a boot disk is brought to |
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>>> the computer to decrypt the boot drive. Grub2 can do this easily. |
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>>> This |
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>>> is to prevent some one to tamper eith a boot loader. |
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>>> System is not protected against hardware tamperment. The server room |
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>>> is an RF-cage. |
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>>> I consoder this setup quite secure. |
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>> |
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>> It's nice to encrypt and wipe things automatically, but what about the |
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>> backups? |
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> |
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> Well i have backups on their own drive with its own keys. I have |
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> backups of the keys in another location. The drives are LUKS drivers |
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> with detached LUKS info. |
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