Gentoo Archives: gentoo-user

From: Joshua Murphy <poisonbl@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-user@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] Curious pattern in log files from ssh...
Date: Sun, 07 Dec 2008 05:52:14
Message-Id: c30988c30812062152v4bdc63dw931120398bd410de@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-user] Curious pattern in log files from ssh... by Evgeniy Bushkov
1 On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 10:05 AM, Evgeniy Bushkov <zhen@×××××××××.ru> wrote:
2 > Adam Carter пишет:
3 >>>
4 >>> Also take a note that there are no "known-compromised hosts"
5 >>>
6 >>
7 >> What about hosts listed in RBLs?
8 >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_DNS_blacklists. It would be
9 >> interesting to see if how much correlation there is between ssh brute
10 >> forcing bots and the contents of the various lists.
11 >>
12 >
13 > It's just interesting. But I don't trust them enough. I don't know how these
14 > lists were composed. We've periodically seen viruses outbreaks, some
15 > computers IPs could get into lists because of trojans and so on. One day you
16 > won't reach your server from your own home computer...
17
18 The fact that a lot of 'compromised hosts' are home users with
19 providers like comcast, verizon, etc lends another trouble as well...
20 dynamic IPs mean that the next person with the luck of the draw in
21 getting that IP can't reach your servers either, and if *you* happen
22 to be that person, no reasonable whitelist will ever get you back in
23 from that location until you get another IP.
24
25 >>
26 >>
27 >>>
28 >>> because ANY IP can be forged.
29 >>>
30 >>
31 >> Its easy enough to forge a SYN, but to setup a session so you can make a
32 >> password guessing attempt requires that you also get the packets back from
33 >> the server, which is an order of magnitude more difficult. Ever since OSes
34 >> have implemented well chosen initial sequence numbers, spoofing of TCP
35 >> sessions has become very difficult.
36 >>
37 >>
38 >
39 > I agree but as admin I prefer to think about many things worse than they
40 > really are. If something wrong is possible it's better to avoid it
41 > beforehand.
42 >
43 > Best regards,
44 > Evgeniy B.
45
46 Careful with that line of thinking... you'll inevitably come to the
47 conclusion that there's no hope and you're better off just turning the
48 system off, unplugging it from the wall, and locking it into a very
49 sturdy vault deep beneath a very solid mountain! (until you ponder
50 yourself insane over the security risks that exist even then, let
51 alone the impact on usability)
52
53 --
54 Poison [BLX]
55 Joshua M. Murphy